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Series	Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme—and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments—it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms—the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases—of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword-based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines—from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature—are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term—to begin 
with: communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, 
machine—diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up 
scholars from North America and Europe, this series also advances 
media theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists 
across language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and 
local academic customs and in order to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses—to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do.
Introduction
Florian Sprenger and Christina Vagt
A body is never moved naturally, except by another body which 
touches it. Any other kind of operation on bodies is either miraculous 
or imaginary.
— Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
When Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his exchange with Samuel Clarke 
in 1715/1716 famously attacked Newton’s theory of gravity for 
introducing “imaginary operations” and “occult forces” into physics, 
he evoked the classic Aristotelian ban of action at a distance: Every 
motion requires a conjoined mover. No action can occur without a 
loss of force and thus without duration. Only by postulating some 
underlying medium could the effects of gravity, as well as electricity 
and magnetism, be conceived as contact forces or action through 
contact. Aristotle’s dictum was translated into modern physics: 
Every transmission of a force from the location of its cause to that 
of its effect requires a medium to ensure its interaction. In the con-
text of this debate, media were regarded as mediating instances 
that enabled what was called communication. If cause and effect 
were not immediately connected but rather spatially separated 
from one another— as in the case of gravitation, magnetism, or 
electricity, for instance— then there had to be a medium to ensure 
both the transmission of the force and the causal connection.
x Even though it is a matter of debate if Newton believed what 
Leibniz attacked him for, his thinking, exemplary for modern 
physics, revolved around media: Newton used the terms “ambient 
medium,” “refracting medium,” or “transparent medium” (each 
written with lowercase letters) to refer to mechanical transmission 
capacities that infuse everything, leaving no empty spaces. At the 
same time, he used the term medium (both in English and Latin) 
when speaking about transmission media or intermediate media 
such as air, glass, or the ether. Clarke, as a substitute for Newton 
in the debate with Leibniz, summarized this necessity as follows: 
“Nothing can any more Act, or be Acted upon, where it is not pres-
ent; than it can Be, where it is not” (Leibniz and Clarke 1956, 21). 
The spirits, ethers, and media introduced by Newton create such 
a material connection and in turn inaugurate, with the proximal 
effect explained by them, an action at a distance by means of 
an imperceptible medium. The intermediary is no longer simply 
spatial but also transmits forces such as gravitation, electricity, or 
light (see Spitzer 1948).
If things seem to act at a distance— if gravitation, magnetism, or 
electricity can overcome distances without evidencing a visible 
cause for doing so— then the question of the causalities, continu-
ities, and materialities of this action gains considerable significance. 
Modern physics as a systematic science has to develop criteria 
for determining which forces are subject to a medium and which 
actions were simply miraculous or inexplicable. In this context, 
the philosophical debates about the structure of space and time 
were updated in light of their historical background and thus, 
as far as the present day is concerned, made legible in implicitly 
media- theoretical terms. They were propelled by a sense of unease 
about the material conditions needed for forces to be mediated 
over distances. For, if no force could be identified to account for 
such mediation, then the path was cleared for divine intervention, 
magic, and miracles.
In the course of the development of electrodynamic theories and 
technologies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
xiphysics operated successfully within the framework of Newtonian 
mechanics and the speculative assumption of an intermediary— 
 the ether— as the underlying medium that acts through contact 
on certain bodies. But the fact that nobody had ever seen or 
measured it occupied physicists and philosophers alike by evoking 
dazzling proofs and thought experiments from Immanuel Kant 
to Hendrik Lorentz (see Vagt 2007). After special relativity finally 
abolished the ether as physical medium, Albert Einstein famously 
attacked the theoretical physics of Niels Bohr and others, stating 
that quantum mechanics with its presupposed quantum states of 
“superposition” and “entanglement” of particles contained some 
“spooky” action at a distance (see Barad 2007, 317– 31). Even 
though these physical debates took place at different times and 
on different scales (macro- and microphysics) they both stress the 
media question concerning modern physics: How is it possible that 
objects interact with each other from a distance, without touching?
When physics describes how things act on each other, how objects 
exert forces on other objects, it has to take the materiality of 
transmission into account. Physics, compelled to think about 
media, is one of the fields of knowledge in which terms of media 
are forged. This book follows some of the trajectories action at a 
distance has taken from physics to questions of human interaction, 
the binding and breaking of time and space, and the entanglement 
of the material and the immaterial in physics and aesthetics. The 
three texts each deal with historical constellations in which the 
mediality of transmission and the materiality of communication 
are debated as questions of acting at a distance— an action, it 
turns out, whose agency lies in a medium. They discuss different 
episodes of the epistemological history of mediation, and move 
through different modes of causation from the immateriality of the 
mind to the materiality of infrastructures and follow the trajectory 
of the transmission of forces. The common question that brings 
them together deals with the conceptual history of mediation: 
they trace the epistemological transformations of what mediation 
(and the related terms communication and causation) means in 
xii different historical contexts. How is mediation represented and 
narrated, how does it challenge the boundary of the material and 
the immaterial, and how does it change in relation to technologies 
of mediation? In all three texts, the distance that mediation implies, 
the meanwhile, the difference and the in- between, turn out to be 
both the challenging and dis- unifying potential of mediation and 
the source of its technical implementations.
With the advent of electromagnetic telegraphy in the 1830s, a 
notion emerging from the history of the sciences of electricity 
diffused into popular knowledge: the instantaneous transmission 
of electric action. Ever since Stephen Gray, as described by Florian 
Sprenger’s essay, explored the possibility of electric transmissions 
through copper wires in 1730, the speed of electricity was an item 
of interest and subject of investigation. Speed was conceived as the 
possibility of nonspeed, as instantaneity means to neglect speed. 
Instantaneity means that transmission does not take any time. 
Electricity and telegraphy were described as timeless and thus hav-
ing no speed. There is a small difference between slow speed and 
no speed, but this difference means everything to physics. Because 
nothing can take place in two places simultaneously and because 
any distant effect requires a medium, the experiments that 
Sprenger’s paper describes were stalked by phantasms of instan-
taneity, immediate transmission, and actio in distans. Simultaneity 
thus becomes a matter of cultural techniques of synchronization.
As John Durham Peters shows, such means of control of 
simultaneity— be it through knowledge, narration, or action— are 
deeply embedded in Western history. His text engages with a host 
of examples of what he calls “meanwhile structures” situated at the 
intersections of time and space. For knowledge and for narration, 
time and space are no barriers and action at a distance is a way of 
synthesizing them: Being at two places at the same time turns out 
to be necessary to narrate stories and know the world— knowledge 
and narration, again, have an agency that acts also at historical 
distances. But being at two places at the same time is only possible 
under the rarest of conditions: when one can work in the no- speed 
xiiimode of instantaneous access of nonlinear movement. Most 
efforts at action at a distance are, instead, subject to the demons 
of microtime, who mischievously filter, distort, block, warp, or delay 
action at a distance. 
Action at a distance through language and communication, 
concepts and models is typically human. German philosopher Hans 
Blumenberg introduced the Latin neologism actio per distans as a 
philosophical term that signifies a prominent type of preemptive 
action among humans: action in absence of the object that is acted 
upon. Christina Vagt’s paper discusses this version of action at a 
distance in the form of concepts, models, and simulations in the 
field of today’s biosciences, where models determine under which 
conditions material action takes place. When an Australian banksia 
cone suddenly opens its follicles after a wildfire to release its seeds, 
cause and effect are evident to the careful observer (the fire gets 
rid of the competition), but how something that is technically dead 
can perform this kind of dynamic motion does appear somehow 
magical— until imaging and modeling technologies finally enable 
the scientists to procure a viable model. Addressing the media 
question underlying material research in the age of computer 
simulation moves the discussion away from actio in distans and 
the inherent causality, instantaneity, and simultaneity debates of 
theoretical physics and toward aesthetic procedures that mediate 
between matter and mathematics and between scientists and their 
epistemic objects.
The term medium, this book argues, is— at least partly— a historical 
effect of the philosophical and physical challenges of actions across 
distance, but it also conveys a certain ambivalence: The term medi-
um, Leibniz claimed, was always in danger of being used willy- nilly 
to explain a situation that might otherwise seem to be miraculous 
on account of its unknown logic, causality, or mode of operation:
If the Means, which causes an Attraction properly so 
called, be constant, and at the same time inexplicable 
by the Powers of Creatures, and yet be true; it must be a 
xiv perpetual Miracle: And if it is not miraculous, it is false. ’Tis 
a Chimerical Thing, a Scholastick occult Quality. (Leibniz 
and Clarke 1956, 94)
Miracles, Leibniz thought, were evoked when a mediating principle 
was needed to explain physical phenomena without explaining 
their specific operations. Associated with this danger was the fact 
that the mediation of a physical effect could only be explained 
by replacing the miraculous with a medium that was itself unex-
plained. The mediation might have occurred in an inexplicable 
manner, but the medium did not appear to be miraculous because, 
by means of its alleged physical properties, it was more or less able 
to explain the phenomenon in question. Although the mediation of 
the medium took place in an inexplicable way, it seemed to explain 
one process or another by its mere introduction, and this was 
because media, according to the physics of the time, were defined 
as material connections that ensured the causality between cause 
and effect. To summarize Leibniz’s critique: If media could be 
used in such a way to explain physical processes, then they served 
as “argumentative resources” (Cantor 1981, 152) for explaining 
the inexplicable while hiding, beneath the cloak of a medium of 
communication, the fact that the process in need of explanation 
was not explained at all but rather replaced by the postulation of 
a causal connection that was itself left unexplained. In all of its 
arbitrariness, the medium would thus come to acquire a sort of 
magical power, for it was used to explain the inexplicable simply 
by being mentioned— “groundless and unexampled” (Leibniz and 
Clarke 1956, 94). His advice is a theory of media: Never replace a 
miracle with a medium, and never mistake a medium for a miracle. 
The medium always has physical properties that mediate its ac-
tions even at a distance.
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[	1	]
Temporalities	of	
Instantaneity:	Electric	
Wires	and	the	Media	of	
Immediacy
Florian Sprenger
Translated	by	Erik	Born
On a warm summer day in 1729, a copper wire was suspended 
across a garden in the south of England. When one end of the wire 
came into contact with an electrified glass cylinder at the other end, 
in the very same moment, little pieces of brass leaf began to dance 
along the wire and settled down on it like butterflies. The person 
who had electrified the wire was Stephen Gray, a passionate 
researcher and a dyer by trade. In doing so, Gray was able to create 
an “elecktrick virtue” (Gray 1731a, 27)— an attraction, an electric 
force— from one side of the garden to the other, a result confirmed 
only by the sound of his friend Granvile Wheler’s voice and without 
any visual confirmation. It even sufficed to hold the glass cylinder 
near the wire without touching it. Sometime later, Gray would 
suspend a schoolboy horizontally and electrify him, in turn, with a 
glass cylinder, thereby making little sparks shoot out from the boy’s 
fingertips to the onlookers. At this stage, the invisible force still 
did not have the power to decide over matters of life and death, 
2 even if it could already be used to kill small birds. It was still not 
possible to distribute anything more than undifferentiated sparks, 
or even to charge them with meaning and code. Transmission was 
still entirely without meaning or application— a medium without a 
message, or rather, a medium whose message consisted in the fact 
that it existed, that it had an effect where there should be none. 
The wire filled a distance, a space between cause and effect, with 
its materiality. Electric action transmitted through the wire seemed 
to be instantaneous, simultaneous, immediate.
And it communicated. Gray called the wires “lines of communica-
tion” (Gray 1731a, 27). He did not have a concept like “cable” at his 
disposal. He knew nothing of insulation, states of electrical charge, 
or electrons. Communication, for the physical knowledge of his 
times, meant the connection between cause and effect. Between 
them, a transmission took place: the necessity of a causal link. 
Every process in the universe, according to the physics of the time, 
must have a cause from which it can be explained. For electricity 
to be able to “communicate” in this sense, three conditions are 
necessary: two separate elements communicating, one at each 
end, and an in- between. The transmitter and the receiver have to 
differ from each other, or else there would be no channel and no 
connection. There have to be “two” in order for there to be a “one.” 
However, these two require a “third”: the medium. Communication 
presupposes a difference, an abyss between sender and receiver 
(see Peters 2000 and Chang 1996). Connection requires separation. 
The aim of communication, speaking generally, is to overcome this 
temporal or spatial difference, to make it disappear. Yet, electricity 
does not merely jump across this abyss; in Gray’s experiment and 
in many other instances of the sciences of electricity, it appeared to 
eliminate this abyss entirely. The transmission of electricity displac-
es space and makes temporal differences imperceptible, thereby 
leaving both space and time immeasurable, while also inserting a 
piece of wire into them. Although cause and effect had been sepa-
rated from each other, they still appeared to be simultaneous— and 
connected through a lengthy copper wire.
3Gray was not able to say whether electricity has a speed. To him, 
it appeared not to require any mediation or any code. It was just 
there, appearing simultaneously at both ends of the channel, which 
was consequently no longer a channel but still opens up a space 
between seemingly simultaneous events. The people communi-
cating over the wire did not have to be present at the same place 
to be connected. But their present coincides. What happened on 
Gray’s end of the cable appeared to happen at the same time on 
Wheler’s end of the cable. Between the ends of a cable, there can 
be an entire garden— soon, the entire world, measured out in 
copper wire— but there can be no minute, no second, no moment, 
no blink of the eye, no delay. The cable and its communication lead 
to an investigation of communicability itself. It spans gaps, and, as 
a medium, it is presupposed by the connection. What Stephen Gray 
transmitted in that garden in the south of England in the summer 
of 1729 was transmissibility; what was communicated in this 
communication was communicability.
The	Materiality	of	Temporality
Cables connect the world. They are everywhere— crossing, 
branching, and interconnecting— wherever electricity, whether as 
energy or signal, should be conducted. Our world is universally 
connected and linked together, on a small scale as on a large scale. 
Cables are hidden inside every housing, behind every wall, in every 
ocean. Whether overground or underground, they connect cities 
and settlements, continents and colonies. As ubiquitous as cables 
may be in our current media- saturated world, rarely do they come 
into view, so concealed is their history.1 So inconspicuous as to be 
frequently overlooked, the cable, as a medium underlying other 
media, can contribute to our understanding of our own time and 
its spaces. Its history is a history of connections and disconnec-
tions, of temporalities and spatialities, and it involves a history of 
mediation and of immediacy. Thus, the history of the becoming of 
cables to be told here is a history of the overcoming of distances 
in durations so short that they are deemed nonexistent, though 
4 mediation depends on them. The media history of the cable is a 
history of the phantasm of immediacy.
Cables, as Nicole Starosielski (2015) has shown, carve up geo-
graphic and architectonic spaces, but they are localizable and 
limited. They overlay geographies and architectures with their 
own relations by redefining places in terms of the beginning or 
the end of a material link. The interconnection of cables creates 
new “spaces of address,” a collection of all the distant places that 
can be reached from a single place, medially, via cable. In different 
historical stages, these “spaces of address” are developed with 
technical means of connection and disconnection from cable 
networks over wireless transmissions to digital networks. The basic 
fact, though, remains constant: The cable addresses because it 
connects. From the time of Gray’s experiments on, the history of 
the cable is bound to the history of addressing (see also Peters 
2006). The cable creates a relation between transmitters and 
receivers, be they human or technical, thereby bringing about their 
addressability, perhaps even their identity (Siegert 1999), though 
at the very least their ability to be spoken to in that they bear an 
address. Every cable has a beginning and an end, and with that, a 
goal in and of itself.2 The materiality of the cable, with its two ends, 
implies two addresses. Transmitter and receiver are functions of 
the cable, and consequently, writing this history implies writing the 
history of these addresses, even before they turn into a network. 
If every hardwired transmission implies a destination, this place is 
located at the end of a cable.
Since that summer in 1729, cables span the world due to two main 
improvements. The first was in terms of the amount of time that 
passes during a transmission. Transmission time is extremely 
quick, supposedly even instantaneous. Eventually, significant 
debates in physics will revolve around its duration. The second 
was that the cable establishes a material connection between the 
places at the two ends of the cable. Laying a cable does not merely 
open up a space; it also connects points in space. A cable is never 
only “here,” but always also “elsewhere.”
5Consequently, from the perspective of media studies, the cable 
makes evident the phatic level of the relation between transmitter 
and receiver— the fact that there will always be a channel between 
them before there is any message. The materiality of the cable 
influences what can be transmitted “over the wire.” It organizes 
space and time in that it separates transmitter and receiver, 
spatially and temporally. The cable itself contains a dimension 
of connection. Disturbances of the cable make it into the object 
of research, generating knowledge about its potentials including 
charge, delay, and transmission (see Hunt 1994). The space and 
time and the phantasms bound to this first electric medium are the 
subject of this essay.
Sciences	of	Electricity,	Practices	of	Wiring
At the time of Gray’s experiments, electricity was commonly un-
derstood as an attribute of objects that would attract other objects 
after being heated or rubbed (see Heilbron 1979). Accordingly, the 
concept of electricity designated a quality that had to be produced 
through manual labor. Interest in electricity was focused on 
researching corpuscles and effluvia, the smallest little bodies that 
were imagined, according to the most widespread mechanistic 
theories, to mediate electric and magnetic effects. Space, so 
people assumed, was filled with these imperceptible bodies, which 
were the cause of every effect, every phenomena, including that 
of electricity. Although electricity would gradually emerge as a 
well- defined field of study, it was not institutionalized for the time 
being, since the results of experiments with electricity were too 
dispersed and the uses of electricity too vague, hardly extending 
beyond spectacular experiments with illuminating balls, floating 
brass leaves, and sparking glass— all of which was an end in itself. 
Responsible for this delay were the precarious and unclear status 
of electricity and the insignificance of electric phenomena. Nobody 
“mastered” electricity; producing it demanded a lot of talent, dex-
terity, and patience (Schaffer 1997, 464).
6 The rules for making electric phenomena appear were largely 
rules of instrumentation. In the experiments conducted by William 
Gilbert around 1600 or Francis Hauksbee around 1710, which had 
marked out the field of electricity before Gray, all the components 
in the experimental setup were located within a single room and 
they all had to be visually perceptible. With Gray, however, the 
framework changes: the spatial “co- presence” of a “transmitter” 
and a “receiver” is no longer necessary. Attraction no longer takes 
place where the electrified objects are located, as in the model of 
attraction discussed in the context of magnetism. If electricity itself 
can be transmitted and “communicated,” as Gray’s experiments 
would subsequently suggest, then the site of its production would 
no longer necessarily be identical with that of its effect. Electricity, 
it turns out, can be sent and transmitted. To do so, wires have been 
bent, hung, compressed, extended, and knotted in a variety of 
forms.
Substances	of	Communication
The path from the wire to the cable leads through several detours. 
As early as 1708, Gray had written a letter to Hans Sloane, the sec-
retary of the Royal Society, the most influential scientific institution 
of its time. As a simple craftsman, Gray did not have the privilege 
of access to the expensive instruments of the Royal Society, falling 
back instead on simple glass tubes, feathers, and brass leaves. In 
the letter, Gray describes how he made a glass tube, which had 
been electrified by rubbing it, attract a down feather at a distance 
of a meter— nothing less than a world record in terms of electrical 
action at a distance:
If when the feather is come to the Glass it be held at 
about 6 or 8 inches Distance from the side of a wall edge 
of a Table Arme of a Chair or the like it will be drawn to it 
and thence to the Glass again and that for 10 or 15 times 
together without ceasing it flies to object at a greater 
Distance but then does not soe often Return. (quoted in 
Chipman 1954, 34)
7Gray’s unpublished letter lays the theoretical foundation for the 
space and time of transmission that the cable will come to occupy. 
In the letter, he sets himself the challenge of explaining how 
effluvia that have been made to radiate outward due to rubbing 
can attract things back to themselves. However, Gray is unable to 
present a solution to this problem of attraction. He even tries to 
refer back to phenomena of repulsion, which had long fallen out of 
the typical framework of observation:
When the feather is come to the Glass and thence Reflect-
ed if you follow it with the Glass twill flee from it and will 
by noe means be made to touch it till driven near to the 
next wall in the Room or some other solid object by which 
twill be attracted and freely return to the Glass again 
Repeating its Reflections. (quoted in Chipman 1954, 35)
Whenever the feather touched the glass, according to Gray, it was 
repelled first to the bodies surrounding the glass, and would only 
then come back to it. Gray’s conjecture here was that all bodies 
emit effluvia, mutually interacting with one another (see Heilbron 
1979, 234), and his later view would be that these effluvia transmit 
so much electric force through the air that any receiving objects 
would likely become electric. Since these effluvia were imagined 
to be something like an atmosphere surrounding an object, they 
should have affected any surrounding object. As the effluvia were 
flowing outward, any surrounding body was also supposed to be-
come temporarily electric: “as all bodies Emitt soe they Receive part 
of the Effluvia of all other bodies that Inviron them and that the 
attraction is made according to the current of these Effluvia” (quot-
ed in Chipman 1954, 36). For Gray, this exchange of smallest bodies 
fills the entirety of space and creates a network out of effluvia flow-
ing between separate objects. In this conceptual framework, there 
is immediately a connection between anything that winds up within 
electricity’s sphere of influence. This space is open but it extends 
only a few centimeters.
How do objects become electric beyond a distance of several centi-
meters, Gray was asking himself, without touching? How do things, 
8 whether glass tubes or planets, have an effect at a distance? This 
question was central to physics since Aristotle, who put forward the 
principle that there must be spatial and temporal contact between 
cause and effect (Aristotle 2008; see Hesse 1955). If a cause and 
an effect are related to each other in spite of the distance between 
them, then they have to be connected by a medium. As a tenet of 
medieval Aristotle reception has it, “Every action happens through 
contact, which is why nothing acts at a distance, unless through 
some medium” (Omnis actio fit per contactum, quo fit ut nihil agat 
in distans nisi per aliquid medium).3 In this economy of causality, an 
immediate effect at a distance, relating two places to each other 
without time, is strictly forbidden. To circumvent this prohibition 
and to explain phenomena like electricity and magnetism, various 
media have been introduced as “argumentative resources” (Cantor 
1981, 152), including ethers, spirits, corpuscles, or effluvia. These 
media ensure continuity even at a distance, conjuring up a connec-
tion even without contact— actio in distans.
Gray’s experiments also followed this powerful theoretical guide-
line of the physics of that time, though he would be the first to 
build an electric medium. However, his theses about attraction and 
repulsion did not initially find any resonance. His next publication 
would appear only twelve years later, an interim during which he 
worked in the laboratory of Newton popularizer John Theophilus 
Desagulier. After another ten years of silence, Gray’s publications 
and influence began to build. In 1731, he demonstrated his experi-
ments to the Prince of Wales, whom Desagulier served as the court 
physician, and the Royal Society awarded him with the first ever 
Copley- Medal, which is still given out today, and did so again in the 
following year. Gray’s work was part of a larger change in scientific 
practice— a movement toward professionalization that would have 
challenged his authority as a poor dyer had his experiments been 
conducted only a few decades later. However, it was precisely this 
manual dexterity, “the dyer’s knack,” (Schaffer 1997, 464) that was 
decisive for the success of his experiments. As the historian of 
science Simon Schaffer has shown, Gray’s exceptional dexterity 
9enabled him to conduct many experiments that would have been 
difficult for those lacking in practice.
Action at a Distance
Gray’s first, short published statement about electricity of 1720, 
though not influential in the scientific community, opens with an 
important observation. After conducting several experiments with 
glass tubes and a down feather attached to a stick, Gray had come 
to a crucial realization: even without the glass tubes, the feather 
would still be attracted to the stick, “as if it had been an Elecktrick 
Body, or as if there had been some Electricity communicated to the 
Stick or Feather” (Gray 1720, 104- 5). Gray’s precise description of 
the phenomena of charge and discharge, which at the time were 
still not defined as such, was the precondition for his thesis that 
electricity can be made communicable. The focus of his research 
changes here from attraction to transmission— namely, transmit-
ted attraction— and thus continues the concern with electrification 
at a distance that the published letter only hints at. Among the 
objects Gray was able to electrify was himself, as his fingers 
attracted feathers or hair. At first, Gray was working with threads 
and paper, “finding them, after they had been well heated before 
rubbing, to emit conspiciously their Elecktrick Effluvia” (Gray 1720, 
106). If many effluvia gather together, Gray thought, they could be 
passed on through communication, without any corresponding 
loss or exchange.
In his next report, published in 1731 though referring to events of 
1729, Gray begins with a mention of more experiments with glass 
tubes, but then, after several changes of scene, goes far beyond 
them, and describes electricity in terms of transmission (Gray 
1731a). At this moment the cable takes the stage. To prevent dust 
from entering the open tubes, which were about a meter long and 
a few centimeters wide, Gray had stopped them up with pieces 
of cork. To his surprise, the corks at the end of the tubes did not 
change the effect of the tube, but precisely the opposite: the corks 
10 themselves proved to be attractive. In the prevailing order of sci-
ence, this should have been impossible, since the corks themselves 
were not electrified.
At first, Gray was not studying action at a distance but action close 
up, an effect that would be explained today as “induction.” He 
went on to replace the corks with all kinds of other materials, or 
he would touch these materials to the corks, thereby transferring 
electricity from one object to the next without having to rub it. Con-
sequently, the cork became a carrier, whereas the transmission, in 
previous experiments, had occurred through effluvia in space. Gray 
was able to transmit electricity from one object to another, even 
if a wire was attached to a cork perpendicularly. In this manner, 
diverse objects could be attached to the tubes hanging in the air, 
and together they formed a new kind of experimental setup. The 
space of transmission now reached, with the cable, from the tube 
to the object.
This is precisely why Gray was able to electrify things— because 
he did not intentionally touch them with his hand, as had always 
happened up till then. In Gray’s setup, objects are, to use our 
current terms, “isolated against discharge.” First, several materials 
had to be constructed as a continuous line. If the effect (which had 
only been present where something had been electrified) appears 
now at the end of the experimental setup, then the object in the 
space between can also be electrified, and it should function as a 
suitable carrier. The in- between object becomes the medium of 
communication. Gray would try out diverse carriers of communi-
cation, such as a fishing spear made of Spanish cane, stovepipes, 
fireplace tongs, as well as whale bones and other sticks or rods, 
copper and iron wire, cords, a tea kettle, even vegetables. Since the 
transmission works best with copper wire, the questions arise as 
to the maximum possible length of this kind of conductor, and the 
potential distances it might overcome— an early signal range test, 
as it were.
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How these pieces of wire were connected to each other is not men-
tioned in any of Gray’s reports. At the time, production methods 
made it possible to create pieces of wire that were at most a few 
meters long, and these could then be tied to each other to increase 
the overall transmission distance. However, Gray was not inter-
ested in finding a practical use for his experiments. They are not 
precursors of telegraphy, however much they may be appear to 
be. After proving that a certain range was attainable, Gray did not 
continue the experiments. Although a transmission distance larger 
than a few hundred feet appears to have been theoretically possi-
ble, Gray initially had no desire to test it. Alongside the fascination 
with attraction without a visible cause, there was also fascination 
with action at a distance that would eventually overcome distances 
too great for the eye to see. There are spatial limits to this desire. 
At first, only a few meters. For longer experimental setups, Gray’s 
room was too small. His first experiments with a horizontal 
suspension failed, because he was using the same material for 
attaching things and as a conductor. Only a trip to the country-
side in Ottenden Place in the county of Kent, in the presence of 
his friend Granvile Wheler, a clergyman and Fellow of the Royal 
Society, allowed Gray to continue his research in spaces larger than 
those of his room in the city, and subsequently to present them to 
the public of the Royal Society upon returning to London.
[Figure 1.1]. Gray’s Cable. Source: Johann Gabriel Doppelmayr, Neu- entdeckte Phaenome-
na von bewunderswürdigen Würckungen der Natur (Nürnberg: Fleischmann, 1744), Table II.
12 Electricity	in	the	Garden
Gray’s accounts of these garden experiments show the significance 
of narrative patterns for anchoring epistemic innovations. What 
could be more unlikely, in this idyllic setting, than the annihilation 
(or, at the very least, manipulation) of space and time? Since no one 
from the Royal Society was able to be present for the experiments, 
Gray’s narration made the reader of the Philosophical Transactions 
into a virtual witness. Gray and Wheler began by hanging the tubes 
vertically, which would then attract brass leaves lying on a wooden 
stool or a glass pedestal. They were able to continue this sequence 
by attaching other materials to the tubes and introducing a rod 
with a piece of ivory at the bottom end. Since Wheler’s house was 
equipped with a balcony and even a clock tower more than ten 
meters high, they were able to experiment with longer setups, 
yet even this height was not enough to exhaust the effect. For his 
return to London, Gray planned to hang a tube from the highest 
point of the cupola of St. Paul’s Cathedral, which would have 
then attracted a brass leaf in the altar sanctuary. However, this 
plan proved unnecessary when Wheler proposed attaching the 
conductor to the roof and having the setup proceed horizontally 
rather than vertically. The advantage of the horizontal setup was 
that no disturbance was possible through “discharge” on any sup-
porting object, which could itself be a conductor, though not in the 
right direction. Gray did not supply a reason for this hypothesis, 
which would become enormously important for further electricity 
research.
Only after several trials did it turn out that the decisive factor was 
not the thickness of the carrier but its material composition. The 
experiment succeeded only with silk threads as suspension. This 
discovery was crucial because insulation— which Gray was still not 
able to name as such— makes of a wire something more than it is: 
the wire becomes a cable. Insulation is the necessary condition of 
the cable, since nothing will flow through an uninsulated wire, and 
the wire will not function as a carrier. The shift in Gray’s experiment 
13from a copper suspension to silk threads implies a distinction be-
tween conductors and nonconductors, and, with that, a description 
of insulation in which the wire turns into a cable. As Gray describes 
the experiment,
Then the Cane being rubbed, and the Leaf- Brass held un-
der the Ivory Ball, the Electrick Vertue passed by the Line 
of Communication to the other End of the Gallery, and 
returned back again to the Ivory Ball, which attracted the 
Leaf- Brass, and suspended it as before. The whole length 
of the Line was 147 Feet. (Gray 1731a, 27)
In this context, the theories of effluvia that had been influential 
for centuries are at their limits, since they can no longer explain 
these occurrences. Nothing can flow from a glass tube over several 
hundred feet without a connection.
The same experiment was continued in open air. Starting at Whel-
er’s estate, they built a conductor crossing silk threads stretched 
between two rods. On July 14, 1729, the length reached 666 feet. 
The return channel, which would allow one experimenter at the 
end of the “line of communication” to report what happened to his 
friend at the other end, consisted of the human voice. Wheler and 
Gray called the results of their tests back and forth to each other. 
The time delay of this return channel was insignificant: Gray would 
not have been able to be at both ends of the setup at the same 
time to confirm what happened or to determine its speed.
From a single source, Gray and Wheler created two, even three 
different conductors, which led off simultaneously in various 
directions. However, time eventually caught up with the two 
researchers:
We began about Seven o’Clock, or some little Time after, 
but before Eight the Attraction ceased: But whether this 
was caused by the Dew falling, or by my being very hot, 
we could not positively say, but I rather impute it to the 
latter. (Gray 1731a, 31)
14 There are no reports of any continuation of these experiments. 
Instead, there was a shift from experimenting with lengths to sur-
faces: in what may be called an unintentional anticipation of  
the global village, Gray and Wheler electrified a twenty- seven- 
square- foot world map. They also found that a suspended circular 
wire would attract brass leaves located below it, provided that it 
was not too far away. While they were able to determine that the 
attraction worked to the same extent in all parts of the circular 
wire, they were not able to determine the location of electricity in 
the circle. What all these experiments have in common is that, no 
matter how long they attempted to make the connection, the effect 
was already there.
If electrifying objects requires the presence of the experimenter, 
who rubs the objects to achieve an effect, the transmitted effect 
must also happen in his absence— that means when there is no 
separation in the connection with the cable. Presence is no longer 
the condition of possibility for making both ends touch but rather 
the necessary result of the transmission. Because electricity is 
present at both ends at once, it is present everywhere. The cable 
has become not only a medium but, more specifically, a medium of 
immediacy— which is impossible in the framework of the physics of 
that time.
Bodies no longer merely receive electricity— they conduct it. In 
addition to corpuscles, these bodies can also be human bodies. In 
April 1740, Gray conducted a spectacular experiment that would 
fascinate audiences throughout Europe and would be demonstrat-
ed in numerous derivations in the form of an “electric kiss.” In the 
experiment, Gray would suspend a schoolboy horizontally from 
the ceiling, put brass leaves on the floor under his hands and his 
hand, and then touch his feet with a charged tube. At the opposite 
end of the boy’s body, the brass leaf would float up to his head. 
In the electric kiss variation, replacing the brass leaf with another 
human being would make the latter get hit with a discharging 
spark. Indeed, as Gray would find out, the schoolboy does not 
even necessarily need to be suspended from the ceiling; it sufficed 
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to put him on a wax pedestal. As in the case of the silk threads, 
Gray was using the principle of insulation without knowing it. Even 
when two boys were put on wax pedestals and connected with a 
wire, they would each exert a force of attraction. The discharging 
spark eliminated distance, wiping out difference and stressing 
discontinuity. However, only contact electrifies: “I then bid one Boy 
put his Finger upon the other Boy’s wrist, and then he immediately 
became electrical” (Gray 1731b, 402).
If human beings are able to conduct electricity, then the exper-
imenter becomes part of the experiment. The presence of an 
experimenter’s body can explain many failures of the performance 
of similar experiments, such as when experimenters would touch 
the electrified tubes with their hands and cause the electricity to 
get lost at these human outlets. The body no longer functions as  
an electric receiver, but as a conductor, and, with that, enters into  
a state of excitement.
Two different forms of transmissions come together in Gray’s 
experimental setup. On the one hand, electricity acts as a mediator, 
without any apparent medium, between one object and another, 
whenever these are approached or touched. On the other hand, 
[Figure 1.2]. Gray’s Transmissions. Source: Johann Gabriel Doppelmayr, Neu- entdeckte 
Phaenomena von bewunderswürdigen Würckungen der Natur (Nürnberg: Fleischmann, 
1744), Table II.
16 electricity gets transmitted to a distant place, making other objects 
become electric and, with that, conductors, transforming the wire 
into a cable. This distance opens a space. In passing something 
on from one object to another, a “line of communication” com-
municates, as in another meaning of this concept, designating 
military supply lines. But the instances of transmission in this “line 
of communication” are tripled: from one object to another at the 
starting point; through an object in the middle; from this object 
to another at the other end. The middle term can be extended to 
almost any desired length.
In London during the winter of the year following his first experi-
ments, Gray would continue his research in this direction, finding 
out that the objects “communicating” with each other did not need 
to be connected to each other directly. There was an effect even 
at a little distance: no contact was necessary. It was sufficient to 
bring an electrified tube in the proximity of a conductor: “commu-
nication” would succeed even without contact. As Gray realized, the 
conductor would even attract a brass leaf at a distance:
By these Experiments we find that the Electrick Vertue 
may not only be carried from the Tube by a Rod or a 
Line to distant Bodies, but that the same Rod or Line will 
communicate that Vertue to another Rod or Line that is 
at a Distance from it, and by that another Rod or Line the 
Attractive Force may be carried to other distant Bodies. 
(Gray 1731b, 404)
It is not necessary for the conductor to “immediately touch” the 
body at the end, for the ball to transmit immediately, as the French 
physicist Charles de Cisternay Dufay would report about the same 
experiment (Dufay 1733).
Hence, Gray’s work marks two shifts in electricity research: first, it 
demonstrates that certain materials are able to transport the force 
of attraction over long distances when they are insulated; second, 
it shows that a conducting third can be switched in between two 
objects. These two shifts allow Gray to create effects that have 
17never existed before. The communicability of electricity constitutes 
a new challenge because it detaches the object of research from 
cosmology and theories of substances (see Ben- Chaim 1990).
Nonetheless, this communicability of electric effects does not 
exhaust itself in research on physical conductivity. The early history 
of electric transmission cannot be described solely in terms of the 
history of physics. It depends equally on the stubborn materiality 
of the cable. The wire leads an experimental life of its own. As a 
medium, it is open to diverse ways of being used— above all, as 
a medial binder. It intervenes in experiments because it breaks, 
is resistant, or leaks energy. A wire can be bent into spirals and 
circles, squares and cubes. It opens up spaces and times, makes 
connections possible, and allows for connections to disappear 
immediately (on the history of wires, see Blake- Coleman 1992).
The	Material	Space	of	Distance
In his theory of the parasite as the “third” participating in every 
relation, Michel Serres attempts to grasp the place of difference, 
which is also the place of the cable: “A third exists before the 
second. A third exists before the other. [ . . . ] There is always a 
mediate, a middle, an intermediary” (Serres 1982, 63). As soon as 
the “line of communication” gets extended to the point that Gray 
can no longer hold it in his hands, the constellation changes. The 
channel creates a medial, material connection between two bodies, 
and constitutes a necessary technical condition of telecommunica-
tion. Although the effect apparently proceeds through a medium, 
instantaneity seems to negate this medium, since the simultaneity 
of cause and effect seemingly extends beyond any speed. With 
Gray, the fascination with simultaneity has materialized in an ex-
perimental setup for the first time. The same fascination will follow 
physics up to the present.4
There is a medium, but there is no delay in mediation. Gray makes 
out “no perceivable difference” in the effects of his experiment 
(Gray 1731a). An electrified body is seemingly “immediately” electric 
18 (Hauksbee 1719/2004, 141; Dufay 1733, 259; Watson 1746, 727; 
Wheler 1739, 100)— immediately in all its parts, without any time 
delay or transmission time. What Gray terms a “difference” in the 
above statement is twofold: the repetition of an attraction that 
stays the same over the course of multiple tests and a temporal 
delay that he is unable to recognize as such. Nothing disturbs or 
inhibits the immediate simultaneity of transmission— and yet, the 
difference between the two places in the garden still represents a 
spatial division between them.
This relation of separation and connection is reflected in the di-
chotomous status of the cable: it is present in both places, but only 
because the other end is absent in that place. This is how the cable 
is able to carry proximity to a distance, and play out its function 
as a medium: it repeats and delays an electric effect. In this sense, 
transmission determines a difference because it makes a differ-
ence: the cable creates a spatial difference in terms of the cable’s 
ends. According to the rules of Aristotelian and Newtonian physics, 
any spatial distance requires time to be overcome, if speed is not to 
be instantaneous. However, the force overcoming space here was 
electricity, and nobody knew whether it required time (see Marvin 
1988). Everything was pointing in the direction that it did not. Since 
transmission time lies below every sensory threshold, it could be 
eliminated without any remainder. For Gray, electric transmission 
appears to be timeless. The events occurring at the ends of the 
cable do not run in parallel; they are connected through a material 
medium, and not merely an effluvial or an etherial one. In turn, 
immediacy is projected onto this medium, which also serves to 
negotiate the new status of absence and presence. This physics of 
electricity, evident in the case of the cable, shakes the foundations 
of science because in its theoretical framework, instantaneous 
action at a distance is impossible. For this reason, writing the 
history of the cable and its transmissions requires casting a glance 
at the transformations of physical knowledge at the time of Gray’s 
experiments. They are also the setup in which the term “medium” 
is shaped in the form that became predominant throughout the 
twentieth century.
19Although many ideas about the utopia of transmitting messages 
at a distance were in circulation at the time, Gray’s experiments 
did not link up with them. “Communication,” in the sense of the 
physical sciences, cannot simply be equated with “communi-
cation” between people, though their conceptual histories are 
intertwined. Gray’s transmission is not a precursor of telegraphy, 
despite having an identical experimental system. Its content is 
itself— transmissibility. In Gray’s experiments, there is no function 
or processing, either in the mathematical sense or in the sense 
of an application, and thus nothing is transmitted other than the 
transmissibility of electrical attraction. The transmission is not 
processed, and yet it shows, through attraction, that it exists. There 
is no content of this communication, which is why it refers to itself 
and thus exposes its properties. Transmission here means that the 
same action happens in the same moment at the beginning and at 
the end. It appears to be instantaneous, without time loss or delay. 
If there is no transmission speed and thus no separation despite 
distance, the two bodies involved in the communication are united 
in their electricity. In this way, electricity is able not only to arrive, 
“live,” at the other end but also to be present at both places.
Only decades later, transmission time, as transport time or signal 
time, will itself become a topic of inquiry only after there are more 
precise measuring procedures for displaying speeds and delays. 
Eventually, it will turn out that every cable influences what it trans-
mits, and that resistance is a variable of transmission. Without this 
knowledge, long- distance transmission is impossible. At the time of 
Gray’s experiments, there was no way to perceive the disturbances 
and temporal delays of electricity, which will become functions of 
cables— for example, in the laying of the transatlantic cable— since 
these functions are dependent on measuring devices that divide 
time or space and make it countable. The sole basis for Gray’s judg-
ment, defining the region in which something can be determined 
to be “present,” was sensory perception. At best, Gray and Wheler 
were able to shout when something happened. But as soon as they 
would raise their voices, it had already happened. Additionally, the 
experimental setups were too large for perception. As long as no 
20 measuring instruments were available, electric transmission could 
only be described as instantaneous: it was not possible to study its 
speed by the means of perception. In the end, the return channel 
would need to transmit just as fast as the electrical conductor (see 
Galison 2003). This is true even if the conductor is laid in a circle, 
thereby bringing both ends together into a single point that can 
be observed at once. The main aspiration running through all the 
work in physics on electrical action at a distance is to determine 
and to measure this time as a physical time, an objective time, a 
time beyond the experimenter’s limited capacities of perception— 
and as a time of the cable.
As the wire becomes a cable, there are several noteworthy 
changes: a new time- dimension of transmission appears, and, with 
that, the possibility of storage. The electric cable transmits only 
attraction, without storage and without processing. Today, every 
signal that gets transmitted has to be processed in order to achieve 
“liveness” and “real- time” (e.g., in digital television transmissions). 
Even though processing time increasingly approaches transmission 
time, the term “real- time” remains a euphemism, and the rhetoric 
of “telepresence” skips over the production of that presence (see 
Sprenger 2015). There is transmission in “real- time.” Every trans-
mission is always mediated, and it is this delay that all technical 
media operate with. Real- time can only mean that signals are 
arriving at the speed in which they can be processed as quickly as 
possible: in time rather than real- time. Real- time always takes place 
between two points in time and is therefore not instantaneous. 
Skipping over this delay means ignoring its influence on how we 
are connected and disconnected.
Allowing the cable to come undone in processes of “instantaneity” 
and “acceleration” amounts to concealing the spatial relations, the 
spaces and times of interruption that are created by electric media. 
It also amounts to obscuring how these media are currently recon-
figuring society. However, it is still important to keep in mind the 
deployment of the cable in the imaginary of its time. In the earliest 
discourses of telegraphy, there was a hope that the establishment 
21of a telegraph line would do away with distances around the 
world, ultimately bringing people, countries, and continents closer 
together (for example Winkler 1750, 5). In this way, telegraphy 
catalyzes both new ideas about community and for communities’ 
self- perception. As one developer of the telegraph, Carl August von 
Steinheil, put it:
Communication is the strongest bond of the living cre-
ation: it connects one individual life to another, reproduc-
es in one that which is a given for all, and thus forms out 
of individual beings species that emerge again as organic 
beings. (Steinheil 1838, 3)
The centrality of the cable for this imagination of an organic bond 
can be seen in an illustration of a figure, alluding to Shakespeare’s 
Puck, alias Robin Goodfellow, who holds both ends of a cable 
wrapped around the globe: whenever he pulls one end, the other 
[Figure 1.3]. Historical Sketch of the Electric Telegraph. Source: Alexander Jones, 
Historical Sketch of the Electric Telegraph (New York: Putnam, 1852), frontispiece.
22 moves. In this case, the cable is a transmitter and a receiver at the 
same time and, as such, does not merely connect individual places 
to each other but rather forms a connection that ends where it 
began— exactly in the sense of a line in Shakespeare’s Midsummer 
Night’s Dream: “I’ll put a girdle round about the earth in forty 
minutes.” The illustration comes from Alexander Jones’s Historical 
Sketch of the Electric Telegraph, which appeared in 1852, before the 
first attempt to lay a transatlantic cable but already anticipating a 
wired world.
Until it became measurable a century later with elaborate devices 
and experimental setups, electricity appeared not to have any 
propagation speed but rather seemed to be at different places at 
the same time. In this instantaneity, electricity is related to media 
concepts used in the twentieth century to narrate the history of 
this very medium. “Past, present, and future merge into electric 
nowness,” Marshall McLuhan will write more than two hundred 
years after Gray’s experiments (McLuhan and Nevitt 1973, 1). 
For McLuhan, the instantaneous, simultaneous transmission of 
the “electric age” will unite the world into a new entity without 
an outside. For Gray, too, instantaneity no longer refers only to a 
constellation present before one’s eyes that can be perceived with 
a single glance, but to the expansion of a transmission in a space 
no longer based on the senses. In these phantasms of immediacy, 
the channel recedes from the picture because the instantaneity of 
ubiquity creates a new entity out of individuals, as in McLuhan’s 
global village, in which the delays and the materialities of the cable 
are entirely eliminated.5
Territories	of	the	Cable
The geographic space of transmission, the distance from one side 
of a garden to the other, is not identical with the territory produced 
by the cable. Whereas this territory depends on the smallest 
possible times, or even no time at all, the geographic space of 
transmission remains as it is. Without electric transmission, a cable 
23is merely a piece of wire, which nevertheless opens up a space. But 
once this space can be crossed instantaneously, or almost instan-
taneously, it ceases to be an obstacle and— simplifying things, since 
new problems and possibilities arise— must be conceived of anew. 
The separation between transmitter and receiver, between glass 
tube and brass leaf, ceases to be of minor importance, because 
the medium between them has been invisibly extended— and 
above all, because the length of the cable seems to be irrelevant 
for transmission time.6 The spatialization of the channel plays no 
role for time: regardless of how long a cable may be, its end will 
always already be at the beginning. Opening up a territory by laying 
a cable creates new spaces and temporal relations. They define a 
space of address.
Materially, the two communicants are relegated to a position 
at each end of the cable, a position that, in transmitting from a 
distance, becomes a location within a new spatial structure that 
is not based on perception. This location can be addressed in 
both orders— in the geographic order as in the territorial order of 
the cable. In each order, however, the cable enters into different 
relations, and borders different places. While closing off geography, 
transmission also opens up a new space in which one end of a 
garden is made to border the other, insofar as both are addresses, 
just as Washington will later border Baltimore, or Britain will border 
America, with the construction of the first telegraph lines. Even if 
transmission is supposed to be instantaneous, its materiality opens 
new spatial relations that start to change the world.
If the space and time of transmission are not conceived of as im-
mediate, the duration of transmission necessarily requires space, 
and the distance of transmission necessarily requires time. Both 
are based on a delay that contradicts their presence. Conceiving 
of the cable in terms of immediacy makes its in- betweenness dis-
appear, and, with that, space and time of media as well. However, 
the difference between the beginning and the end of a cable, 
qua différance, transforms the phantasmal unity of transmitted 
electricity into a duality. Communication inserts an interval into the 
24 unity, an interval that is, to take up a thought of Jacques Derrida, 
equally different:
This différance of the between, this elementary différance 
of inter- position or intervals between two surfaces is at 
the same time the condition of contact and the origi-
narily spaced opening that calls for technical prosthetics 
and makes it possible, without any delay. (Derrida 2007, 
229– 30)
In other words, distinguishing A from B requires determining A 
by determining B, and this implies a delay: temporally, A comes 
before B, and between them comes the cable. As a spatialization 
of transmission, the cable causes delays due to the fact that both 
ends of the cable are predetermined to be addresses of transmis-
sion. This is due to the differentiating function of space: wherever 
A is located, B cannot be located, and, for this reason, there has to 
be a distance between them, which also differentiates them from 
each other. In terms of time, however, B can also be A’. The phan-
tasmal immediacy of action at a distance, in which an action can be 
present at two or more places at the same time, would eliminate 
all of this: it would make A out of B, thereby wiping out division 
and disconnection. Ironically, the Leipzig- based cable researcher 
Johann Heinrich Winkler, who continued Gray’s experiments a few 
years later, remarked as early as 1750: “At present, the speed of 
communicated [or, transmitted] electricity cannot be determined 
due to a lack of the required space” (Winkler 1750).
Thus, the cable is a measuring tape, a stopwatch, and a carrier 
rolled into one. It serves not only to transmit information or 
energy, but also to measure these transmissions in terms of their 
extent, speed, and distance, and to enable research on the space 
of transfer. In doing so, however, the cable intervenes in the 
transmission, since the speed of electric transmission, as would 
later become evident, is relative to cable length. In this sense, the 
cable requires research about the places where it is laid, such as 
knowledge about the peaks and valleys it has to cross, or the depth 
25of the sea it gets lowered into. The cable and its long enigmatic 
resistance have ensured that the effect at its end is not identical 
with that at its beginning; even with the best insulation, there will 
inevitably be a loss. At first, this was not measurable because there 
were no corresponding instruments and dimensions, no units 
transforming space and time into measurable amounts. The history 
of the cable as a medium between immediacy and mediation is 
related to a history of measuring and proportioning electricity.
After Gray, the subsequent course of electricity research would be 
inconceivable without the cable. What would become known as 
the first stable functioning electromagnetic telegraph, created by 
Carl Friedrich Gauß and Wilhelm Weber in Göttingen in 1833, was 
initially nothing other than an experimental cable system, which 
served their research on the galvanic chain and their attempt to 
validate Ohm’s law. With Georg Simon Ohm, the cable appears as 
a medium of delay and shows a resistant materiality. Ohm would 
formalize the principle of electrical resistance, which, in turn, is the 
foundation for the worldwide rise of telegraphy. The second half of 
the nineteenth century will become the age of long- distance cables, 
not only for the purposes of transmitting information but also, 
starting in the mid- 1880s, for transferring energy. Thanks to the 
telegraph network, built to a global scale, the cable will become a 
medium of universality. Above all, cable research will come into its 
own, with the laying of the undersea cables, as a unique scientific 
field with protagonists like William Thomson and Michael Faraday 
whose starting point will be disturbances of communication and 
not its success (see Volmar 2009).
In short, since Gray’s experiments, the cable temporalizes 
spatialization, it overcomes space in time, thereby creating a 
time between two places. The cable requires, systematically and 
physically, a rudimentary storage function: the contents of any 
transmission that is not instantaneous have to be stored, at least 
temporarily, because they have to exist somewhere, in some state, 
during the duration of the transmission. Electricity and cables, 
and later on, signals and messages, exist only in their execution, 
26 in performance, in circulation. And electricity can be measured 
only in this execution. At the end of every cable, the same effect 
that entered into it at the beginning should ultimately arrive. In 
Gray’s experiments with the cable, this repetition consists solely of 
the effect of attraction. However, with the development of better 
measuring instruments, more reliable sources of electricity, and, 
above all, the breakthrough of electromagnetism, this repetition 
will have become standardized only several decades later to the 
point that the cable can be equipped with signals, eventually mak-
ing it the basis for telegraphy and finally the transmission of the 
binary signals that still constitute our digital cultures. Transmission 
relocates effects to the places determined by a wire, which, for this 
very reason, has already become a cable.
Notes
 1 While the history of the transatlantic cable is well known and Nicole Starosiel-
skis media ethnography has explored submarine cables in detail, the histories 
and uses of shorter cables, for example in the domestic context, remains 
opaque.
 2 For a deconstruction of communication as a separation that presupposes a 
connection, see Chang 1996.
 3 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Summa Philosophiae (1614), qtd. in Spitzer 1948, 
201.
 4 For more detail, see Sprenger 2012.
 5 For a recent iteration of these phantasms, see (Isenstadt 2018, 14– 16). For 
Isenstadt, instantaneity, immediacy, and action at a distance are simply given 
physical and technical phenomena, which is wrong: no physicist of that time 
would have agreed that electricity is instantaneous or that action at a distance 
is possible. Newton, Faraday, and Maxwell, whom Isenstadt quotes, explicitly 
rejected this perspective. The seeming instantaneity of all- at- onceness that 
was established with telegraphy nonetheless became a cultural phantasm that 
Isenstadt’s book on lighting explores in great detail, while still adhering to the 
phantasmatic dimension of immediacy.
 6 For experiments following up on Gray’s experiments, see Desaguliers (1734).
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A	Cornucopia	of	
Meanwhiles
John Durham Peters
Oblivious	Simultaneity
Events have always been happening at the same time. Billions of 
things are happening this very second around the globe, in my 
immediate vicinity, and even within my own body, all without my 
knowing anything about them. If it is overwhelming to think that 
about six thousand people die and fifteen thousand more are 
born every hour, abandon all hope of trying to track the mitosis 
of cells or the work of chlorophyll! Counting would fail if we tried 
to quantify all the things that happen without notice, especially 
once we dive into microscales! (Surely the number of unnoticed 
things vastly outstrips the number of things known or observed.) 
Oblivious simultaneity, as we might call it, seems simply part of the 
order of things. Our bits of awareness are rare and scattered lights 
on a dark landscape of unknowing. So the poets and philosophers 
have long told us. Everything flows, said Heraclitus; “Mudam- se os 
tempos,” wrote Camões; “Nobody knows nothing anymore,” sings 
Billy Bragg.
Conscious or controlling simultaneity, however, is quite a different 
animal. To know, narrate, or act upon another event occurring at 
the same time but in a different space requires a logistical link of 
some kind in matter or mind, in transportation or communication. 
30 This essay explores human- based simultaneous action at a 
distance. It compiles a comparative history of meanwhile struc-
tures, which I define as techniques of shuttling between two points 
in space at the same time that are too far apart for the unaided 
human senses. From a patchwork of examples, several of them 
from that library of ancient literature gathered in the Bible, I hope 
a central point becomes clear: that banking time is a way to span 
space.
Anderson:	Meanwhile	Structures	in	
Modernity—	and	Antiquity?
Benedict Anderson, in his highly influential Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983), speculates 
that “every essential modern conception is based on a conception 
of ‘meanwhile’” (24). He locates this particularly in the modern 
media (“forms of imagining”) of the novel and the newspaper, and 
in his second edition of the book (1991), in the census, map, and 
museum as well. The novel “is a device for the presentation of 
simultaneity in ‘homogeneous and empty time,’ or a complex gloss 
upon the word ‘meanwhile’” (25). A novel can jump horizontally 
between scenes— same time, different space— and tell of charac-
ters whose lives run in parallel and could cross unwittingly in the 
street without being aware of their remote links. “In Imagined Com-
munities,” he later wrote, “I argued that the historical appearance 
of the novel- as- popular- commodity and the rise of nation- ness 
were intimately related. Both nation and novel were spawned 
by the simultaneity made possible by clock- derived, man- made 
‘homogeneous empty time,’ and thereafter, of Society understood 
as a bounded intrahistorical entity” (Anderson 1998, 334). (By intra-
historical, Anderson means secular or common time, not eternity; 
see Culler 1999.)
Anderson spins the story elegantly: once upon a time, history 
and cosmology were inseparable, and time present contained 
time past and time future. Now we live in a dull and disenchanted 
31world, where the clock ticks away relentlessly and time flows in a 
straight line. (Hence the rise of nationalism as an answer to the 
question of meaning for men and women stripped of ancient 
religious frameworks.) This tale of a massive shift from sacred to 
secular, vertical to horizontal, recursive to linear time might be the 
founding story of modernity. “Our own conception of simultaneity,” 
he states, “has been a long time in the making, and its emergence 
is certainly connected, in ways that have yet to be well studied, with 
the development of the secular sciences” (24). Antique narratives 
were not capable of cross- cutting, as the film- editing technique is 
called that takes you instantly from one scene to another— near or 
far— in a parallel time. Petronius’s Satyricon, the scurrilous Roman 
novel, in some ways is a forerunner of the modern novel, but “its 
narrative proceeds single file” (25). There is no “in the meantime” 
movement from one scene to another.
Anderson places the big shift in the eighteenth century. Evidently 
borrowing from Marshall McLuhan, Anderson treats the essence of 
the newspaper as “calendrical coincidence” (33).1 What all the news 
stories in a daily edition had in common was that they occurred 
yesterday. (The more recent 24/7 news cycle changes this circadian 
rhythm.) Readers of newspapers partake of “the diurnal regularities 
of the imagining life” (35n63): in both narrative structure (many 
events, one text) and audience behavior (many readers, one time) 
newspapers follow a logic of composite juxtaposition. In the middle 
ages, artists could portray local patrons at the birth of Jesus in 
Bethlehem without worrying about anachronism; now was then 
and here was there. Under the regime of modern clock time, in 
contrast, modern novelists and journalists learned to array events 
as parallel in space rather than time. At least so goes the argument.
Was Anderson right? Could events happening over great distances 
be coordinated when messages traveled no faster than foot, 
horse, pigeon, or ship? Were there no robust meanwhile structures 
before the eighteenth century? Did the apparently instantaneous 
transmissions of the telegraph enable new modes?
32 Biblical	Fathers	and	Sons:	Characters	 
Transport	Narrative	Focus
Let’s test Anderson’s thesis with two of the Bible’s most memorable 
narratives, both of which concern fathers and brothers separated 
in different places with very different fates. Neither story has any 
simultaneous back- and- forth between parallel developments until 
the brothers actually come back into the same place, bringing their 
time streams with them. In the book of Genesis, Joseph is sold into 
Egypt by his jealous brothers, who assume that he vanishes into 
servile anonymity. When a terrible famine later drives them into 
Egypt in search of food, they meet an imposing Pharaonic figure 
whom they don’t realize is Joseph, who has— in the meanwhile— 
risen to the heights of the Egyptian world. The narration follows the 
physical movement of the brothers; it has no wings to jump from 
Egypt to Palestine. Likewise in the parable of the father and two 
sons told in the book of Luke, the younger, “prodigal” son demands 
his inheritance, moves to a far country, and squanders his wad in 
what the King James Version memorably calls “riotous living.” When 
he returns in frustrated impoverishment, his father welcomes him 
home royally, much to the umbrage of the older, faithful brother. 
We never hear of the two brothers at the same time in different 
places; the two narrative streams only come together when the 
brothers do. What is interesting here is not the parallel develop-
ment of separate stories. That has always happened. What is inter-
esting is the lack of narrative means for saying “meanwhile, back at 
the ranch.” The narrative proceeds, as Anderson says, single file; it 
does not outpace the physical limits of the characters’ movements. 
There is no magic carpet that carries the reader telegraphically to 
different places. The moment of recognition is only possible with 
physical presence.
Prophetic	Vision:	Live	Feed	or	Memory?
Yet in both the Bible and in Homer, there is such a magic carpet 
device— but apparently only for the gifted and for gods. The book 
33of Ezekiel gives us the first. The first verse sets up the drama: the 
heavens open up to a visionary man located in unusually specific 
circumstances: by the Kebar river, in Babylon (Iraq), among a group 
of captives, on the fifth day of the fourth month of the thirtieth 
year. The Jews are in Babylonian captivity, far away from home. But 
Ezekiel, with its colorful and weird imagery as well extreme behav-
ior by the narrator, is a psychedelic, literally trippy book, especially 
with the narrator’s frequent flights between Babylon and Jerusa-
lem. The spirit moves him, levitating or teleporting him through the 
air, where he witnesses people and buildings, especially the temple 
in Jerusalem, from his location in Iraq. It is not clear whether he is 
supposed to be accessing events archived in memory or viewing 
a live feed. When Ezekiel sees, for example, a prince of the people 
named Pelatiah die in Jerusalem (Ez. 11:13), is this supernaturally 
privileged access to news he could not have received so quickly 
in Babylon by normal means or a recounting of an already known 
event? No one could know without a system of verification that at 
that time would have to travel on land.
The	Homeric	Meanwhile?
In Homer, the gods of course are not bound to the sluggish speeds 
of earth travel. Athena can zoom from the Phaeacians to Olympus 
and back where she appears to the shipwrecked Odysseus in veiled 
form (Odyssey, book 6); she serves as the puppet master of the 
several plots in the Odyssey, tracking down Telemachus, the long- 
missed son of Odysseus, in Sparta, for instance, at the opening of 
book 15 before she jets back to Olympus. Telemachus then ap-
proaches Ithaca in his ship while Odysseus feasts and tells identity- 
cloaking war stories with his friend Eumaeus the swineherd. At line 
301 the narrative wings from Telemachus steering his way through 
the rocky islands around the island to the hut where Odysseus,  
Eumaeus, and others are hanging out. The transition is marked 
by a well- known Homeric formula that means something like “but 
then, on the other hand,” but doesn’t commit us to understanding 
it as a “meanwhile,” though it is sometimes translated that way.2 
34 There is no single point of view on the island that I know of where 
a physical viewer could have stood to take in both the hut and the 
ship synoptically. In a similar way, book 16 of the Odyssey shifts 
focus between the palace, the hut, and the ship on the shore. 
The narrative slices through space with the same speed that 
Athena flies.
As these examples suggest, narrative structure with regard to 
space and time in Homer is highly varied and complex. There is a 
more than century- old debate in Homer studies about Zielinski’s 
law, which decrees that simultaneous events in Homer are always 
narrated as sequential. Early on, the debate was inspired by the 
Anderson- like and perhaps condescending thought that ancient 
authors could not imagine simultaneous events, but the obvious 
point that Homer is a poet of enormous narrative prowess who 
handles time and space in a variety of ways, not always consistent, 
has been made by many scholars since. (For an excellent overview 
see Scodel 2008). But for us the relevant point is that brilliant schol-
ars have not been able to settle the question for good whether 
there are meanwhile structures in Homer. That the question is 
open is itself a sign that his narrative world was different than that 
of the modern newspaper or novel, where there could be no such 
question. Anderson both offers too stark a historical narrative of 
before- and- after and sees something important about modern 
narrative organization.
Eratosthenes:	A	Priori	Synchronization
Eratosthenes, the third- century BCE Greek mathematician, as-
tronomer, and chief librarian of Alexandria, was the first that we 
know of to arrive at an accurate estimate of the earth’s size. He did 
so via a thought- experiment that put two distant places into one 
time. There are learned debates about his methods— did he take 
shadows from wells, towers, or sundials? What are the modern 
equivalents of his measurements? Did he round his calculations 
for arithmetic convenience? But here is one account of what he 
35did: He knew that on the summer solstice that the sundial in 
Alexandria, in northern Egypt, showed a shadow of 7.2 degrees. 
He also knew that at Aswan, 5000 stadia to the south on the same 
meridian, there was no shadow at noon on the same date: the 
sunlight went straight down to the bottom of a well. He assumed a 
round earth, and perfectly parallel rays of sunlight. He didn’t need 
a telegraph relay from Aswan to tell him that the sun was casting 
no shadow at noon; he knew that already and took it as given. The 
regularity of planetary rotation obviated the need for fresh data. 
Astronomical constants do not require empirical confirmation and 
remain invariant compared to noisier and more mutable kinds of 
data, such as weather data. Using basic geometry— quite literally, 
the science of earth measurement— he inferred that the angle of 
the shadow at Alexandria would be the same as the angle from the 
center of the earth to the two cities (see Figure 1). This angle was 
7.2 degrees, or one fiftieth of a circle (7.2/360 = 1/50), so Eratosthe-
nes figured that the distance from Aswan to Alexandria, known to 
[Figure 2.1]. Inspired by Ryan (2016: 372).
36 be 5000 stades, was one fiftieth of the circumference of the earth. 
5000 x 50 = 250,000 stades. If, as one historian concludes, a stade 
was about 157.7 meters, then Eratosthenes’s estimate was 39,425 
kilometers, which is remarkably close to the earth’s equatorial 
circumference of 40,075 km (Engels 1985). (The earth, like many of 
us, bulges at the middle, and its meridional or north– south circum-
ference is 40,008 km.)
The	Hare	and	the	Hedgehog
Eratosthenes engaged in what we can call space- axis manipulation, 
a term I owe to Paul Frosh. This is an odd and interesting kind of 
action at a distance. In such a priori synchronization, a single per-
son combines two observations in the nonlinear time of memory to 
fly across one fiftieth of the earth’s surface. But let us be more pre-
cise. Eratosthenes did not have to fly across the two spaces. He was 
already in both, or at least had instantaneous knowledge of con-
ditions of both spots at once. He operated in the symbolic realm 
free of the grind of real time. His memory was a random- access 
database. This is timeless simultaneity, as explicated by Hartmut 
Winkler in a brilliant essay (Winkler 2009 and 2015, 233– 54). 
Building on the Grimm Brothers tale of a race between a hare 
and a hedgehog in which the hedgehog, obviously a much slower 
runner, always wins, Winkler contrasts two modes of operating 
in space and time. The hare always uses up time in running the 
race, however little. The hedgehog, however, requires no time to 
traverse point A and point B because he— or she— is already there. 
That is, the hedgehog cheats by stationing at the endpoint of the 
track his wife, whom the hare mistakes for the original hedgehog. 
Whichever direction the hare runs, he finds the hedgehog already 
there, victorious. The hare can never win against an opponent who 
spans space instantaneously. The hare must always pay a toll to 
time. Because the hedgehog has taken advantage of earlier time 
to pre- distribute over space, travel is free. Or rather, no travel is 
necessary. In memory, like any archival system that gathers many 
moments into an instantaneous array, the past and the present are 
37contemporaneous. (This is the mode of apprehending time that 
Anderson thought uniquely medieval or sacred; it is in fact one of 
the fundamental modes of— nonlinear— temporal organization.) 
The hare mode is typical of media operations that transmit, such as 
telegraphy and telephony; the hedgehog mode is typical of media 
operations that spread all at once in advance, such as publishing. 
(We ignore the many further subtleties here.) Most narratives inch 
along in hare mode. A play like Hamlet jumps between different 
characters and scenes, but the implication is that we are in a weird 
kind of diachrony. Eratosthenes, rather than rapid movement,  
had a real simultaneity. So, with help of earth, sun, and memory,  
meanwhile structures were possible, at least rarely, in the ancient 
world.
The	New	Moon:	Synchronization	 
Plus	Buffering
Contingent and variable data cannot be handled hedgehog style. 
Such data perish in time, and so transit speed affects their value. 
The moon’s phases are an example. The ancient Jewish calendar 
pivoted on the new moon, which marked the beginning of the 
month and of many holidays.3 The new moon must be sighted but 
varies slightly by point of view on earth. A new moon occurs when 
the moon is between the earth and the sun; it is therefore invisible 
by the naked eye for a variable period of around twenty- four hours. 
The paradoxical challenge is to spot something that you can’t see, 
so you settle for the first sliver of the crescent as proof of the new 
moon. Determining when it is at its smallest (= newest) is always a 
judgment call with potential for a slight geographic bias. Another 
complexity was that the Jerusalem Sanhedrin held a monopoly on 
determining the new moon until the fourth century, when Hillel II 
introduced a regular calendar. To send the signal to a people scat-
tered across the ancient Middle East faced many perils. Its drag left 
ambiguity about its accuracy: the speed of transmission always af-
fects time- sensitive information. The solution reached was to grant 
double holidays to the diaspora: assuming that remote intelligence 
38 might be unreliable, you build in a fudge- factor to account for mes-
sage latency. (Even with instant signal transmission today, most of 
the diaspora observes double holidays; some pleasant things live 
on even after the reason for their origin has passed.) Delay was not 
the only problem: so were faulty or corrupt witnesses, tampering 
with the fire signals, clouds or fog that obscured sighting of the 
moon or the fire signal, slow messengers or ones who refused to 
travel on a holy day, etc. (If the announcement of the holiday caus-
es its messengers to violate its sanctity by traveling on it, this is an 
odd contradiction. The fact of the holiday would be news that that 
fact makes unshareable!)4 The strategy here is synchronization plus 
buffering to allow for lag times to pool and catch up or run ahead.
Information	Is	Never	Free
It is dangerous to be a messenger. For a messenger bringing un-
welcome news to a volatile tyrant, never was McLuhan’s equation 
of medium and message more fraught. In the first chapter of 2 
Samuel, an Amalekite soldier brings news to David of the death 
of his sometime opponent and father- in- law King Saul. David asks 
how he knows that Saul is genuinely dead. The messenger tells 
of coming upon Saul after his unsuccessful attempt to fall on his 
sword. The Amalekite finds Saul badly wounded but agonizingly 
still alive; Saul asks him to kill him, and he complies. In telling 
David this, the messenger thought he was currying favor; instead 
he was confessing to a crime. The admission cost him his life, 
as David orders his henchmen to murder him. This story leans 
toward a crucial quantum discovery: that information is never free. 
Information is ontologically part of the system: you cannot observe 
a system without engaging it. Maxwell’s demon is the fantasy of 
costless information— a fantasy that went down, literally, in smoke. 
The universe will run down; information is intervention. These two 
truths have much to do with each other. The nature of the cosmos 
and the limits of our knowledge are one. And the nature of the 
cosmos is that time runs in only one direction: anything we know 
comes at the expense of time (Kittler 2003).
39Dialectic	of	Buffering
A lot can happen while a message is buffering. The book of 1 Sam-
uel tells the episode of the city of Jabesh threatened by the Ammo-
nites. The elders of the city ask for seven days to send messengers 
throughout Israel to see if anyone of their compatriots will come to 
their aid. Officially they are asking for time to transmit a message, 
but they are also gaining time to mobilize. The transmission of 
the data is also the readying of an army. In such situations signal 
and ontology most closely approach each other. Much mischief 
can occur between point A and point B in hare mode. Aristotle, 
in the Politics, smirks that Babylon was more a nation than a city: 
“Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before some part 
of the inhabitants became aware of that fact.”5 Aristotle thought it 
absurd that a polis would not be in instantaneous communication 
with itself. It was supposed to be a single body, “always already in 
synchrony” as Helge Jordheim remarks.6
But even bodies are not self- transparent. Herrmann von Helmholtz 
discovered the finite speed of nervous propagation in the 1840s, 
forever ending the fantasy of complete self- unity. “I think, therefore 
I am” was now “I think, therefore I am belated.” Imagine the split 
second in which I have died but my brain hasn’t gotten the news 
yet. Of course, the fact that I am alive enough not to know I am 
dead suggests I might not yet be dead. The body, like the ancient 
Jewish diaspora or a metropolis like Babylon, could never be on 
one precise same time grid. Where the ancient world could only 
imagine the terror of organic mismatch for the Leviathan of a state 
like Babylon, after Helmholtz it was a fact written into all nervous 
systems. That held especially for the Leviathans of Moby- Dick, 
whales whose long nerves suggested potentially significant syncing 
mismatches. Did their two, entirely independent, non- binocular 
eyes cause them to live in a synthetically integrated immersive 
now- time, or did they require a completely different mode of being 
in time (see Moby- Dick, chapter 74)? The problem of communication 
within the polis moved to the physical body.
40 The	Moon:	Romantic	Simultaneity
Separated lovers have at least the moon in common. Probably 
every generation has rediscovered that the moon can serve as a 
transponder for bouncing heartthrobs to other parts of the earth. 
The moon as an instantaneous relay was expressed by the Tang 
poet Zhang Jiuling (678– 740 CE) in “Looking at the Moon and  
Thinking of One Far Away” (望月怀远). In one translation (Bynner 
1982, 66):
The moon, grown full now over the sea,
Brightening the whole of heaven, 
Brings to separated hearts 
The long thoughtfulness of night.
It is no darker though I blow out my candle.
It is no warmer though I put on my coat. 
So I leave my message with the moon 
And turn to my bed, hoping for dreams. 
According to Su Hua, one of the lines may be translated more 
directly as “the sea gives birth to the moon (and) even the ends of 
the earth share the moment.” She also points to the closing line of 
a famous poem by Su Shi (1037– 1101 CE), the many- sided poet- 
statesman of the Song dynasty, called “Water Melody”: “Though 
three hundred miles apart, we are still able to share the beauty 
of the moon together.” That poem’s “I” says he wishes to ride the 
wind but fears the cold of the high altitudes and settles instead 
on a reverie with the moon beams. In a different mode, Li Bai, 
perhaps China’s most famous poet and, like Zhang from the Tang 
dynasty, tells of drinking alone to the moonlight, the moon and its 
shadow providing company for him and making three total. Here, 
of course, is no synchronization, only the moon as a companion for 
the lonely— as it was a go- between for the separated lovers in the 
other poets.7 René Girard’s point, made in a series of books start-
ing in the early 1960s (see Girard, 1961) that romantic love always 
involves a third party, was never more true.
41Retrospective	Simultaneity
The Christian Gospels recount many episodes of Jesus healing 
people. Sometimes he touches them, or they touch him, and some-
times he concocts medicaments on the spot of mud and spittle. Yet 
he also often cures the sick at a distance, and in many instances 
touch is superfluous. For a comparative history of simultaneity, the 
most interesting episode (John 4:46– 54) occurs when a royal official 
hears that Jesus has entered into Cana, a town in Galilee, and 
approaches him, asking him to come down to Capernaum, pre-
sumably a day’s journey, in order to heal his son. Jesus says that he 
doesn’t need to come and sends the man home, telling him that his 
son will be fine. The official trusts him and returns, and on the way 
is met by servants who tell him that his son has recovered. He asks 
them when it happened. The fever, they report, broke yesterday at 
the seventh hour (about one in the afternoon). Cross- checking the 
timestamp, the man realizes that was exactly when Jesus talked to 
him; he and his household become firm believers when they realize 
that the healing must have been caused by Jesus. The Gospel of 
John uses this retrospectively established simultaneity to make a 
point about the nature of faith, but it is a simultaneity discovered 
only after the fact by comparing two separate chronologies— 
standard for a world without any system of synchronizing time 
across distance.
The	Genitive	Absolute;	Or,	Event-	Splices
If biblical narrative proceeds normally single file, there nevertheless 
are many examples of two things happening almost exactly at 
the same time. The four messengers to Job, announcing the four 
rapid disasters that destroy all his family and possessions, come in 
quick succession, each one overlapping slightly with the previous— 
following “hard upon,” as Hamlet has it. There are two dramatic 
event splices, for instance, in Luke’s story of the Passion. Luke 
22:47 says that “while Jesus was yet speaking” the mob led by Judas 
came to arrest him. Peter then follows Jesus at a distance, warming 
42 himself at a fire and sputtering denials against curious onlookers 
who think they have seen him with Jesus. After the third denial, 
again “while he was yet speaking,” the cock crows, Jesus turns and 
looks at him across the crowd, Peter remembers his promise never 
to deny and Jesus’s warning that he would do so three times before 
the rooster sounded, and goes outside to weep bitterly. You can 
almost imagine the camerawork.
Erich Auerbach has wonderfully analyzed this episode already 
(see Auerbach 1946, chapter 2). I want to reflect more specifically 
on the ways the text treats time. This is not a modern meanwhile 
structure, because the figures remain within sensory range of each 
other; for me, a genuine meanwhile structure must involve cross- 
cutting between remote scenes. But the grammatical structure 
in Greek of the genitive absolute allows for the juxtaposition of 
two happenings, one suspended in the absolute, and the other 
with a finite verb. This kind of event- splice happens biblically 
when two happenings are within range of each other, not at a 
distance. The grammatical structure occurs hundreds of times in 
the New Testament, and more rarely in Homer, Thucidydes, and 
Plato (Fuller 2008). It links two happenings— causally, concessively, 
consecutively— by floating one in absolute form, and the other 
finite. Greek grammar enables meanwhile structures of a sort.  
But only if one is suspended in a tenseless (timeless) state.
Magic Carpet Rides
Almost as in Ezekiel, fast travel across great gulfs of space occurs 
in The Book of a Thousand Nights and One Night. In Richard Burton’s 
translation: “Prince Husayn . . . spread his carpet upon the court- 
ground behind the Khan wherein he lodged, and sitting thereon, 
together with his suite and the steeds and all he had brought with 
him, mentally wished that he might be transported to the cara-
vanserai where the three brothers had agreed to meet. No sooner 
had he formed the thought than straightway, in the twinkling of an 
eye, the carpet rose high in air and sped through space and carried 
43them to the appointed stead where, still garbed as a merchant he 
remained in expectation of his brothers’ coming.”8 The carpet is 
a hare, not a hedgehog, since it takes some time, even if only the 
twinkling of an eye, but the preestablished meeting point with his 
brothers suggests hedgehog- like preprocessing, the use of past 
time in order to set up a later cost- free simultaneity. You need 
to use expensive time to buy free time, or loose time to prepare 
for tight time. (Chess players know that bad moves lose tempo. A 
strong position is the same as having spare moves.)
Sympathetic	Simultaneity
Francis Bacon explores eight forms of action at a distance: com-
municable diseases, light and sound, electricity and magnetism, 
gravity, interpersonal influences of affection and imagination, 
the influences of celestial bodies, sympathy, and “emission(s) of 
immateriate virtues” (Bacon 1844, 2:124). As is typical with Bacon, 
the list combines elements easily recognizable to us with ones that 
look weirdly medieval. Bacon clearly is a bit skeptical about the 
last one but feels called to investigate the idea “that in things, or 
the parts of things that have been once contiguous or entire, there 
should remain a transmission of virtue from the one to the other: 
as between the weapon and the wound” (126). He is referring to 
the practice of unguentem teli, or anointing at a distance, in which 
a salve applied to the sword that caused a wound will heal the 
wound, however far away its victim happens to be. It is a kind of 
hedgehog argument: an entire system retains its integral virtue, 
even when sundered. Bacon might have been interested to know 
of quantum entanglement, which is surely just as weird!
Longitude:	Chronometer	as	Telegraph
Bernhard Siegert places the deep history of the modern quest for 
simultaneity at sea: in the problem of how to determine longitude 
(Siegert 2015). The rise of simultaneity to the forefront of early 
twentieth- century physics is not simply the culmination of a long 
44 history of scientific experimentation but also part of the history 
of an imperial struggle for power, for control over the seas, 
that goes back to the sixteenth century. Ptolemy, the late Greek 
astronomer and geographer, already designed a grid system of 
latitudes and longitudes, but it took on new life as a technology 
of power under the Portuguese and Spanish seaborne empires. 
Longitudes, of course, draw imaginary north– south lines from pole 
to pole. Because of the remarkably stable rotation of the earth’s 
axis, north and south are essentially invariant within historical 
epochs, and latitude is relatively easy to calculate: a clear view of 
the horizon and a sighting of the North Star allows you find the 
angle between the two. That angle is your latitude. On the equator, 
the North Star is on the horizon, and your latitude is zero; at the 
North Pole, the North Star is directly overhead and your latitude is 
90 degrees. (South of the equator you can use the Southern Cross 
instead of the North Star.) Finding your point on the east– west axis 
is, however, another matter. The earth is always spinning; there 
are no fixed celestial points to designate an invariant east or west. 
There could be no such thing as an East Star!
In 1530 the Belgian mathematician Gemma Frisius had the 
brilliant thought to use another point on earth as the standard for 
longitude. The earth rotates twenty- four hours a day, on annual av-
erage, and so a reliable clock on a sea voyage set to the local time 
of a distant place could indirectly indicate eastward or westward 
displacement from that longitude. Fifteen degrees of longitude 
equals one hour of the earth’s rotation. The problem was that no 
clock could keep accurate enough time at sea to be functional, 
thanks to many factors including the rocking motion that threw off 
its spring balances and exposure to temperature, humidity, and 
water itself. For more than two centuries a reliable sea chronome-
ter was a major agenda item for European science and technology, 
a problem in mechanics, metallurgy, and waterproofing, until the 
British clockmaker John Harrison decisively solved it in 1762. (The 
problem of longitude drove Christiaan Huyghens’s invention of the 
second hand in 1657, among other innovations.) The notion of pre-
45cision, which had long pertained only to the sky, was brought down 
to earth, or rather to sea. The exact measurements of celestial 
position that astronomers had been making since antiquity went 
horizontal. My eyes, my finger, that star; here at sea, clock, there at 
that time. If you know, for instance, that the sun rises at Greenwich 
at 4:42 a.m. on June 21, and you have a clock that gives you the 
exact time at Greenwich, and the sun rises for you when that clock 
says 8:42 a.m., and you are on the same latitude as Greenwich 
then you know that you are four hours later, i.e. 60 degrees west of 
Greenwich. (If you aren’t on the same latitude, tables can help you 
make necessary adjustments.)
Here is something remarkable indeed: the complete fulfillment 
of the hedgehog principle. The ship and Greenwich are already in 
touch. Like Eratosthenes, there is no need to transmit any data. 
Both can count on the regularity of the earth and its rotation as 
a given. Such instantaneous communication might seem magical 
and silly in Bacon, but Greenwich and the ship do communicate in 
some odd way out of time. The clock serves as a wireless telegraph 
avant la lettre, a benign and portable doppelgänger of Greenwich. It 
receives intelligence from afar regardless of weather, pirates, inter-
ference, or glitches. Here is a time- and- space coordination system 
with little vulnerable infrastructure. A watch, said Norbert Wiener, 
is “a pocket orrery,” or miniature model of the heavens. Heavenly 
patterns locate ships moving about the globe for economics and 
empire. Time here is a proxy for space.
Synkairization	through	Networks
What if we thought of syn- kair- ization as well as syn- chron- ization, 
if you will forgive the ugly term? That is exactly the crazy undertak-
ing of meteorology, the gathering of many kairoi into one synoptic 
forecast. (Kairos means weather in modern Greek.) Meteorology is 
a privileged site for seeing changing conceptions of time, and mod-
ern weather data is perhaps the clearest of all domains for seeing 
space- time compression.
46 Local weather description existed from time immemorial, but in 
the 1780s came the first efforts to track large- scale weather events 
with real data. Natural philosophers had long sensed that local 
weather was dependent on remote conditions but because the 
speed of weather’s change was greater than the speed of data’s 
transit, same- day, large- scale weather events could only be studied 
and mapped after the fact. If it was hard to send data about the 
new moon in antiquity, it was even harder to send sufficient data 
about the fickle atmosphere. (Meteorology has always been a 
big- data science.) The very idea of a weather map was a major 
innovation— a map of quickly fluctuating things such as rainfall, 
temperature, or pressure instead of rivers, shorelines, and 
mountain ranges. In history maps were generally of constants, not 
variables. Indeed, until the late nineteenth century, climate science 
was a branch of geography until it was claimed by the physicists.9
German physicist F. W. Brandes may be the first to have made a 
weather map (1816). His plea for Europe- wide help on his project 
to reconstruct the weather in Europe of 1783 reveals the toil and 
trouble facing any ambitious weather knower before high- speed 
data transfer (Brandes 1819). His grand ambition was to map 
the temperature in Europe “gleichzeitig” or simultaneously. He 
complained how “utterly exhausting” it was to sort out a “host” 
(Heer) or “ocean” (Meer) of “a hundred thousand data- points” when 
only a few hundred belonged to each day (625). The glimpse of 
larger patterns gave some relief (Aufmunterung) from the toil. 
He was on the brink of discovering low- pressure cells, which far 
outspan the observable range of an individual tethered to the 
earth. (Only with space flight and satellites did global weather 
come into phenomenological range.) His textbook, Beiträge zur 
Witterungskunde (1820), also starts with weariness amid heaps of 
data. He had to sort through 180,000 discrete bits of data, 70,000 
of which he gathered himself. The research process took him to the 
verge of total despair about “die so oft erfolglose Versuche etwas 
Regelmässiges in diesem Gewirre zu entdecken,” the so often 
unsuccessful attempts to discover anything regular in this snarl; his 
47efforts were interrupted by the recurrent crushing (niederschlagend) 
feeling of having accomplished nothing (iv). The subtitle announces 
his more specific aim: “gleichzeitige Witterungs- Ereignisse in weit 
von einander entfernten Weltgegenden.” In 1820, the only way to 
analyze “simultaneous weather- events in mutually remote regions 
of the world” was retrospectively— and via networks. Weather 
data had to be composite. A pressure system could be seen only 
by many eyes and ears. For him, it took several decades to gather 
enough data to map a single day’s weather.
Timelines	into	Timepoints
William Charles Redfield (1798– 1857), one of the first American 
meteorologists, “didn’t need an observer network, at least not at 
first,” says Mark Monmonier in his useful history of weather maps 
(Monmonier 1999, 31). Traveling from western Massachusetts 
to his home in Connecticut in 1821, Redfield noticed that trees 
flattened in an earlier storm “were uniformly prostrated towards 
the south- east” (21, original emphasis), while the trees that fell in 
central Connecticut were all facing the northwest. Aha! He thought: 
“This storm was exhibited in the form of a great whirlwind” (21, origi-
nal)! A single person, endowed with a purse full of post- hoc flexible 
time, could compile observations of a single event whose radius 
was unübersichtlich in real time. Rather like Eratosthenes, Redfield 
was his own network: he could cross- cut in memory. After gather-
ing more data, including discussions with sailors, he reconstructed 
the storm ten years later in an 1831 journal article (Redfield 1831). 
His doctrine was the circular motion of storms; hurricanes were 
like big tornadoes. The piece ends with an appeal that anyone 
possessing additional facts should “leave a memorandum” with 
hydrographers Edmund and George Blunt in New York City, sellers 
of nautical books and charts (51). Redfield shows the centrality of 
the postal system to eighteenth and nineteenth century meanwhile 
structures, a critical nationalist medium of imagining untouched by 
Anderson, but Redfield also shows that one observer can produce 
their own meanwhile— rather like a novelist or a journalist.
48 One critic thought Redfield’s inability to prove tight synchronization 
was his Achilles’ heel: the trees could have been flattened by a 
different or later storm two or three days later (Mitchell 1831, 362). 
Such is the eternal threat to retrospectively inferred simultaneity: 
the risk that indeterminate time lags confound the data. Only as 
the electrical telegraph provided weather data in more or less real 
time were same- day weather reports possible. This was a boutique 
genre in the 1850s and a fledging journalistic genre in the 1860s, 
in the United States and United Kingdom at least. The telegraph 
enabled the separation of communication and transportation for 
the first time in history, says James Carey (1989). That may be, but 
the telegraph also did something else: it separated weather from 
climate for the first time! Climate lasts weeks, months, seasons, or 
years: weather is daily. Brandes reconstructed the weather of 1783 
in 1816; Redfield of 1821 in 1831; James Pollard Espy analyzed a 
June 20, 1836, storm in an 1837 report. The amount of time that it 
took to cover space was shrinking.
The	Demons	of	Microtime
Just as the telegraph made instantaneous communication possible, 
thoughtful souls discovered its bondage to the Hare principle. Elec-
tricity travels at the speed of light— and the speed of light is finite. 
Even the fastest transmissions cannot exceed 300,000 km/sec. On 
a cosmic scale, this is not fast enough to create a central grid of 
time coordination. The telegraph enabled superfast transmissions 
and also disclosed the older regime of a universe of asynchrony. 
This is the discovery of Einstein (Galison 2003).
The between- time is a time for mischief of all kinds, as well as 
of monopolies of knowledge. The novelist can track between 
characters. Mathematicians and evangelists can dramatically join 
separate events. Young meteorologists can read storm patterns 
they could not have witnessed for themselves. The stock market 
now operates in microseconds and even nanoseconds, thanks to 
high- frequency trading. Paul Baran’s supposedly innocent plan for 
49a network based on the microtimes of packet switching has created 
a system in which every node could potentially access the whole 
network, in which every split second was the strait gate through 
which the spies and hackers could enter (Sprenger 2015). Blind-
ness to the arts of buffering time has cost us all dearly. Oblivious 
simultaneity is written into our condition, but critical analysis helps 
us see that synchronization always takes time, affects space, and 
consumes energy or power.
Notes
I am grateful to the Center for Advanced Studies in Oslo for giving me time and 
space to write this piece. I thank Helge Jordheim and Espen Ytreberg for friend-
ship, hospitality, and commentary.
 1 Anderson mentions The Gutenberg Galaxy with a brisk brush- off (34n58), but 
see McLuhan (1952). “The new book of the people, the newspaper, created a 
one- day world utterly indifferent to the past, but embracing the whole planet. 
The newspaper is not a time- binder but a space- binder. Juxtaposed simultane-
ously in its columns are events from the next block with events from China and 
Peru.” A newspaper “surrealistically” collects its items under the rigid “conven-
tion of a single date- line.”
 2 Thanks to Mary J. Depew for guidance on Homer.
 3 This custom is based in the Hebrew Bible and is developed in the Mishnah’s 
section on festivals (Moed).
 4 A helpful collection of sources and more recent discussions of the doubling  
of the “yom tov” (holiday) is http://www.michaelbrochstein.com/misc/Second 
DayYomTov.htm.
 5 Aristotle, Politics, book 3, part 3, trans. Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
politics.3.three.html.
 6 Personal communication, June 22, 2019.
 7 See https ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuidiao_Getou 千里共嬋娟. Personal com-
munication, Su Hua, June 15, 2019.
 8 Richard Francis Burton, trans., The Book of a Thousand Nights and a Night (1887), 
vol. 13 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Book_of_the_Thousand_Nights_and 
_a_Night/Volume_13.
 9 The work of my colleague Deborah Coen is essential; see Coen (2018).
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Physics	and	Aesthetics:	
Simulation as Action  
at a Distance
Christina Vagt
In today’s material science, “spooky” action at a distance has no 
place. When an Australian banksia tree suddenly opens the follicles 
of its cones to release its seeds in the aftermath of a wildfire, 
cause and effect are evident to the careful observer: The fire gets 
rid of the competition. But the sheer fact that the cone, which has 
been technically dead for a decade, can actually perform this kind 
of specific and goal- oriented motion does appear strange— until 
experiments in combination with imaging and modeling techniques 
finally enable scientists to procure a viable model that can not 
only simulate the opening process of the follicles but also explain 
its material structure in detail. The role of computer models for 
this kind of material research is crucial because it mediates not 
only between theory and data but also (re- )directs the research 
itself. By discussing two experimental systems from the field of 
biomaterial research in terms of aesthetic theories, this essay 
pursues two strategies: to demonstrate how the mediation 
between experimental and simulated data codetermines whether a 
viable model of a biomaterial structure can ever be procured, and 
second, to understand scientific computer models themselves as 
aesthetic procedures that create their own specific objects of study 
52 [“Anschauungsobjekte”], therefore extending the media question 
underlying natural sciences into the realm of digital technologies. 
Computer simulations belong to a long history of action at a dis-
tance through models but also through concepts, and the question 
they raise does not concern causality and instantaneity so much 
as the relation between living processes and their mathematical 
conceptualization.
Computer	Simulations	with	Blumenberg
Recent decades have produced a growing number of publications 
on the history and epistemology of computer simulations within 
the history of science, media studies, and philosophy of science. 
Peter Galison describes the coming of computer simulations as a 
new and interdisciplinary way to conduct science beyond the tradi-
tional distinction of theory and experiment. Beginning with historic 
computer simulations that led to the design of the first hydrogen 
bomb in 1952, computer simulations changed the status of the 
computer within science and engineering from “computer- as- tool 
to computer- as- nature” (Galison 2011, 121). Paul Edwards states 
that, during the Cold War, simulations had “more political signif-
icance and more cultural influence than the weapons that could 
not be used” (Edwards 1997, 14). Claus Pias (2011) demonstrates 
the rootedness of computer simulations in so- called mode- two 
sciences that operate in a problem- oriented, contextualized, and 
multidisciplinary fashion. They produce second- order statistics that 
can model the behavior of systems within complex environmental 
interactions, and, as a political technology, they belong to preven-
tive risk- managing strategies of governance. Eric Winsberg (2003) 
argues that techniques of simulation, like experiments, have a life 
of their own and carry their own credentials. Meanwhile, Till Grüne- 
Yanoff and Paul Weirich (2010) refer to the flexible distinction be-
tween computer models and simulations, while providing a useful 
overview of the scientific use of simulations that might function 
as proof, projection, explanation, or policy formulation. Last but 
not least, Gabriele Gramelsberger stresses the role that computer 
53simulations play in sciences without “first principles,” such as 
life sciences, neurosciences, and climatology and their role for 
sociopolitical practices that rely heavily on models (Gramelsberger 
2011). She also relates computer simulations to textual narrations 
in fiction, such as a short story, novella, or detective story. Like 
literature, computer simulations apply different temporalities, and 
the temporality of the plot is not identical with the time of the plot 
(Gramelsberger 2008).
The following essay builds on this historic and epistemological 
research, while stressing the role that aesthetic procedures play for 
computer models and pursuing the hypothesis that computer sim-
ulations are aesthetic procedures in and of themselves, because 
they create their objects of study— they make things appear that 
weren’t known before. The starting point for this inquiry into the 
interaction of technology and aesthetics are two experimental 
systems in the field of biomaterial research, which investigates 
structural mechanics performed by animals and plants. The role 
of imaging technologies for computer models in biomaterial 
research was obvious from the start, yet, through observations 
and discussions with the involved scientists and engineers over the 
period of one year, it also became clear that the models redirect 
the imaging process. This “loop” between scientists and modelers 
(Gramelsberger 2008) gave rise to my own research on the function 
of aesthetics for concepts of matter, because it raised questions 
about the influence of design [Formgebung] on the conceptualiza-
tion of biomaterials and living matter.
To mobilize aesthetic theories in order to understand the role of 
imaging and modeling technologies in material sciences might 
seem an awkward approach— to scientists and engineers, at least, 
who usually think of them as tools. What this aesthetic discussion 
provides is insight into the reality claims of both the model and the 
modeled object, something that is rarely discussed in science and 
engineering but is nevertheless crucial when it comes to discuss-
ing the outcomes of scientific research with a broader public, 
especially when modeling plays a central role in politics and policy 
54 making. The experimental setup of these systems, which constantly 
trade first- and second- order data, allows for a “close reading” of 
the modeling process itself. Even though no immediate political or 
ethical questions implied in the research will be discussed here, 
understanding how imaging and simulation techniques bridge 
the gap between classic experiments and computer models might 
also provide insight into how to read more complicated models 
in which the mediation between object and model cannot be as 
easily followed, as is the case with climate models (see Oreskes, 
Stainforth, and Smith 2010).
Within their respective experimental systems, computer simula-
tions define living matter as scientific objects in terms of the “space 
of possibility,” a term borrowed from Michel Serres, who borrowed 
it from Robert Musil (see Serres 1978). The computer model de-
fines the probabilistic realm that restricts possible data values and 
behavior— both experimentally and virtually. This highly dynamic 
space that— unlike the classic spaces associated with Newtonian 
mechanics or Euclidean geometry— is not fixed once and for all, but 
rather its actuality depends on its ability to simulate the behavior 
of the material under specific conditions. And while the model is 
being used to simulate behavior under variable conditions, it is it-
self subject to modifications by the modeler. As an epistemological 
technology, i.e. a knowledge- generating technology, computer sim-
ulations are themselves the outcome of a new statistical concept 
of matter that started with thermodynamics and electrodynamics 
and was eventually formalized in nuclear and quantum physics 
during the first half of the twentieth century. According to quantum 
physics, matter is conceived as being both discrete and continuous 
but more importantly as dynamic, since it exchanges energy with 
its environments. It even defines certain properties of time and 
space rather than being submerged to fixed space coordinates. 
Not only does matter stop being passive and inert, it also gives 
rise to new means of manipulation and technology design. When 
John von Neumann and Stanislav Ulam designed the first computer 
model, it happened in the attempt to solve the almost unsolvable 
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weapon whose physical properties were not understood in detail 
and that, furthermore, couldn’t be subjected to classic experimen-
tation either, because the forces and temperatures involved were 
too destructive to be tried out under laboratory conditions? Over 
the course of the twentieth century, simulating something that 
cannot be tested under real- world conditions became the new 
third category added to the former scientific duality of theory and 
experiment, according to Galison (see Galison 2005). This “third 
way” of simulation became particularly productive in engineering. 
Largely overlooked, however, has been that any procedure for 
making things appear to the senses— making things appear where 
they are not, or rather before they actually come into being— is an 
aesthetic procedure.
When computer simulations are part of complex experimental 
systems involving different kinds of measuring and imaging 
techniques, they mediate between image and model. This process 
cannot be entirely reduced to semantic or logical terms. It is in fact 
an aesthetic procedure in the sense of designed sensual cognition 
[gestaltete sinnliche Erkenntnis], whose outcome depends on the 
potential and quality of the measuring and imaging techniques that 
are applied, as well as the design of the model. In this sense, com-
puter simulations themselves can be understood as an aesthetic 
procedure that requires, like any other aesthetic procedure in liter-
ature or art, a certain temporal and spatial distance to real- world 
phenomena of the living environment and its corporeal and tactile 
information. In today’s scientific cultures, computer simulations are 
a prominent type of action at a distance, a classic concept of agen-
cy that does not exclusively refer to physical phenomena, such as 
electromagnetism or gravitation, but also to cognition. According to 
Hans Blumenberg, action at a distance signifies physical as well as 
cognitive processes, and cognition always implies sensual data and 
therefore aesthetics (see Blumenberg and Haverkamp 2010). The 
ability to act from a spatial and temporal distance, to act on some-
thing in absentia, is not exclusive to humans— after all, the sun acts 
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agency to a large degree. For Blumenberg, human action is charac-
terized by an “ontological distance between an object of knowledge 
and its knower” (Blumenberg and Hawkins 2015, 156). Conceptu-
ality is grounded in this type of remote agency: A Begriff, a notion 
or concept, is an action that implies the absence of the object. The 
German notion for “notion”— Begriff— implies greifen, which can be 
translated as “to grasp,” “to grab,” or “to seize,” as does the English 
notion “concept,” a calque from Latin “concipio’” or “con” (with) + 
“capio,” where capio means “to capture,” “to seize,” or “to take.” 
Concepts have to be vague enough to encompass the boundaries 
of a thing and yet leave enough room for any concrete perception 
still to come along. Concepts act like a mesh for future sensations, 
they are a form of preemptive action, which Blumenberg imagines 
to have started in prehistoric times with the throwing of a spear 
or the setting of a trap. Preemptive behavior exists in all human 
societies, at work in hunter- gatherer cultures as well as in Europe-
an philosophies of mind, matter, and life. Concepts as preemptive 
behavior are not simply based on objects— as a fact, the former 
constitutes the latter. According to Kant, this is particularly valid for 
mathematical terms; according to Freud this is true for the notion 
of the unconscious; and according to Leibniz, it also applies to play-
ing music, a mental power of computation without the awareness 
that one is generating numbers. Mathematics, the unconscious, 
music— these are three very diverse realms that nevertheless are 
driven by objects that are themselves generated by concepts. In a 
more general sense, Blumenberg implies that they provide a par-
ticular insight into the structure of human reason, which is another 
example of an object generated by concepts. Human reason as the 
sum of conceptuality relies on action at distance, on the aesthetic 
intermediation between concepts and objects. Computer simula-
tions therefore belong to the history of action at a distance through 
notions and reason, they are a type of symbolic labor [Arbeit am 
Begriff] with real- world consequences. And just as concepts and 
reason evolve through aesthetic processes involving metaphoric, 
metonymic, and contingent elements, computer simulations— even 
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pattern recognition, and design [Formgebung].
The two experimental biomaterial systems that are discussed  
here serve as close readings of engineering methods applied  
within the life sciences. They demonstrate how matter and life 
are converging within the modeling process, and how imaging 
and modeling techniques bridge the gap between these formerly 
distinct orders. Of primary interest here are not the scientific 
outcomes but the modeling process itself, how it can be better 
understood within the intertwined histories of aesthetics and 
matter, and how it can inform media- theoretical discussions on 
matter and materiality.
Imaging	Tunicates
Tunicates, in Latin oikopleura dioica, are tiny marine animals almost 
invisible to the human eye. As part of the zooplankton, they inhabit 
the upper, warmer layers of the world’s oceans, especially coastal 
waters (Scripps Institute 2019). Their specialty is that they unfold a 
“house” or “body housing,” also described as “filtering mechanism” 
that enables the animal to filter the sea water for digestible algae 
and transports it into the mouth of the animal (see Jany und 
Razghandi, forthcoming). A research group at Humboldt University 
in Berlin and the Max Planck Institute for Material Science in Pots-
dam under the leadership of biologist Thomas Stach investigates 
the anatomical mechanism that unfolds the house. In order to 
study the filtering and unfolding operations of the house, they are 
attempting to build a computer model of the organism in order to 
eventually be able to simulate the unfolding process of the house 
as a whole and to find answers to the leading question: Is there a 
specific design, a biomaterial design, that enables the tunicate to 
unfold its complex cellulose house approximately every four hours 
during its short lifespan of seven days?
After slicing the material and taking single microscopic images, 
thousands of slices have to be reassembled both manually and 
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[Figure 3.1]. Microscopic image of a living tunicate inside its “house.” 
The head of the animal is dyed yellow and orange, parts of the house 
are already filled with undigestible purple- dyed plant particles. Image 
courtesy of Khashayar Razghandi.
[Figure 3.2]. As with most biological research, it starts with microscopy. 
The animal body or biomaterial is cut into ultrathin slices, each only 
a couple of hundred nanometers thick, and each microscopic image 
is digitally captured. Image courtesy of Khashayar Razghandi and 
Thomas Stach; produced in the laboratory of Thomas Stach (Humboldt 
University, Berlin, Comparative Electronmicroscopy).
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through software into a three- dimensional model, which is then 
able to generate parameters to create a second model that can be 
used to run computer simulations on the material.
There are also non- invasive imaging methods that try to cap-
ture the living animal in water. The high- resolution images and 
two- minute- long microscopic film sequences that are produced 
grant insight into the motoric skills of plankton. The animals drift 
directionless, absorbing algae. Their movements are character-
ized through the pulsating rhythm of their beating tails, and the 
different degrees of liquidity and firmness, translucence and 
opacity, create the ambience of a floating dance. Beautiful without 
question, it is difficult to capture on microscopic film the exact 
moment when the animal unfolds a new house. Stach’s group has 
not been able to realize a computer model on the basis of this 
imagery. There were simply not enough viable data. Among the 
difficulties of the modeling process lies life itself. Technologies such 
as Raman spectroscopy and electron microscopy often help to 
identify the distribution of biochemical components and structural 
organization within biomaterials, but the biomaterial has to be 
[Figure 3.3]. A 3D model is then built from the microscopic images. Image courtesy of 
Khashayar Razghandi and Thomas Stach; produced in the laboratory of Thomas Stach 
(Humboldt University, Berlin, Comparative Electronmicroscopy).
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“prepared” in order to employ such technologies, a highly technical 
process that is also deadly for the animal. The paradox of these 
efficient measuring and imaging techniques lies in the fact that 
they cannot be performed on living organisms, and a dead animal 
can no longer perform the unfolding mechanism.
Biomaterials	with	Bergson	and	Schrödinger
This paradoxical relation between living motion and its visual 
and conceptual representations lies at the core of science and 
philosophy— at least in the view of French philosopher Henri Berg-
son, who calls it the “cinematographic mechanism” of the human 
intellect. It signifies a fundamental shortcoming of perception, 
intellect, and language: Humans perceive, recognize, and verbalize 
motion by looking at it from the outside, as a succession of discrete 
[Figure 3.4]. Still image from a microscopic film, with a cloud of orange- dyed algae that 
the animal will start feeding on soon. After a couple of hours of eating and filtering, 
the house is completely opaque and congested. The animal leaves its house behind, 
and after a couple of hours and unfolds a new one. Image courtesy of Khashayar 
Razghandi.
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of motion as being sprawled out within a Cartesian coordinate 
system, allowing for its translation into algebraic formula and 
calculation (see Bergson 1908, 295– 375). The cinematographic 
mechanism is probably the most quoted Bergsonian metaphor, 
ever since Gilles Deleuze based his cinema theory on it. But beyond 
its historic epistemology of chrono- photography and cinema and 
in an even more general sense, Bergson used it as metaphor for 
human cognition as a mode of simulation.
The mechanism that simulates continuous motion by moving a 
succession of still images at a rate that escapes the human eye 
is a technical concretization of the relation between intellect 
and matter— at work in our everyday perceptions just as in the 
measuring sciences. Bergson never seems to get weary of pointing 
out this blind spot in European philosophy, tracing it from ancient 
Greece to modern physics of the early twentieth century, following 
the succession of paradoxes on motion and time. The deficiencies 
of language are not the point of origin for this blind spot, nor does 
it lie in the mathematical worldview of scientists. Rather, the cine-
matographic mechanism points to Bergson’s anthropological con-
ception within the structure of the universe itself. It is a necessary 
intellectual and scientific self- deceiving mechanism that results 
from what one might call the will to conceptualization or abstraction 
from a concrete situation or object that lies at the bottom of both 
image- and language- creating processes— Nietzsche calls it the “will 
to metaphor.” It is not restricted to a specific media- technological 
apparatus; the apparatus simply demonstrates or concretizes 
the general act of human cognition, which can only deal with real 
processes and their perceptual data in their absence, by simulating 
them: Every continuous motion, be it that of light or that of one’s 
own arm, is dissected into discrete sections only to be artificially 
reanimated into a perceivable motion. European thought has been 
confusing processes of becoming with the successions of forms 
right from the beginning, from Platonism onward. According to 
Bergson’s judgment, both science and philosophy are based on this 
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it as best it can, philosophy needs to reveal it in order to illuminate 
the mind’s constant simulation of motion, which permits— through 
distance— different, more complex forms of behavior and action. 
When it comes to simulation, science and philosophy seem to work 
in opposite directions. This division of labor becomes particularly 
clear when Bergson elaborates on the history of matter: Most 
physicists before 1900 and the advent of special relativity theory 
treated solid matter as if it were identical to geometry, following a 
concept of passive matter inherited from Descartes and the tech-
nique of analytical geometry culminating in Newtonian mechanics. 
From a historical perspective, the task of physics has been to push 
representations of matter virtually toward the direction of space, 
because matter and human intellect (which is itself immersed in 
a material universe) alike have a natural affinity for space and 
geometry; matter and intellect share a certain degree of inertia, 
so to say. As a result, physics before the nineteenth century 
ignored the temporal aspect of the material universe, the fact 
that it is immersed in processes of evolution and becoming (see 
Bergson 1944, 216). Bergson sees the reason for this geometrical 
bias, this geometrical inclination of science, in the structure of the 
universe itself: Everything that exists, including matter, is subjected 
to processes of temporal change and becoming but can only 
appear to the senses because it is embedded in matter. Science 
has to overlook the fact that it deals with life only in terms of the 
cinematographic mechanism, that it has to simulate an object in 
order to learn anything about it. According to Bergson, concepts 
of science are but symbolic or visual simulations, mathematical 
notations, aesthetical procedures, and they could have turned out 
in many different ways. But even though they are never inevitable 
or determined, they also did not evolve by pure chance, otherwise 
science would not have progressed:
And yet there is an order approximately mathematical im-
manent in matter, an objective order, which our science 
approaches in proportion to progress. [ . . . ] It is true that 
63laws of mathematical form will never apply to it complete-
ly. For that, it would have to become pure space and step 
out of duration. (Bergson 1944, 218)
Matter appears to be subjected to change and becoming, and at 
the same time it has a tendency toward the rigor of geometric 
relations. It is extended between two poles, one of pure space 
and one of pure becoming, but it will never entirely coincide or 
converge with either one of them. The artificial or human aspect 
of modern science is not the geometrical bias itself but rather the 
need to measure, which paradoxically generates its success:
In a general way, measuring is a wholly human operation, 
which implies that we really or ideally superpose two ob-
jects a certain number of times. Nature did not dream of 
this superposition. It does not measure, nor does it count. 
Yet physics counts, measures, relates “quantitative” varia-
tions to one another to obtain laws, and it succeeds. (218)
Against the background of evolutionary theory, Bergson concludes 
that mathematical order is in itself not factual or real but simply 
“the form toward which a certain interruption tends of itself, and 
that materiality consists precisely of an interruption of this kind” 
(219). Lacking the modern concept of information, Bergson strug-
gles to explain how mathematics introduces negativity into matter, 
and how this solely serves a communicative, social function: “Nega-
tion, therefore, differs from affirmation properly so called in that it 
is an affirmation of the second degree: it affirms something of an 
affirmation which itself affirms something of an object” (288).
If negation is a process that takes place in time, it is primarily a 
temporal and not a logical operation and immanent in all material 
processes. With this understanding of mathematics as a symbolic 
and socially determined type of interaction with material processes 
of change and becoming, there is no need to assume a presta-
bilized harmony between mathematics and the world, because 
their relation— being social and communicative in nature— is not 
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between actuality and formalism in philosophical systems, spoken 
or formal languages, social organization, and so on.
And yet it [mathematics, CV] succeeds, just because there 
is no definite system of mathematical laws, at the base of 
nature, and because mathematics in general represents 
simply the side to which matter inclines. [ . . . ] we can 
take matter by any end and handle it in any way, it will 
always fall back into some one of our mathematical for-
mulae, because it is weighed with geometry. (219)
Life and matter are two different motions bound to interrupt each 
other. In its most extreme forms, matter almost exhibits purely 
geometrical, mechanistic behavior— that is why Bergson some-
times refers to it as the “automatic” or “inert order”— a pretty ade-
quate description of what physics nowadays calls the stillness that 
befalls quantum systems near absolute zero. Matter near absolute 
zero does not allow for life, because the living is weighted with 
becoming and subject to constant change. Transformation cannot 
happen without matter, matter would not exist without transfor-
mation: “Things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of 
becoming. There are not things, there are only actions” (248). Over 
the course of the history of Western sciences and their media 
technologies that measure motion, matter seems to be on its way 
toward mathematics. In the late 1930s, at the end of Bergson’s 
lifespan, which saw the coming of relativity theory and quantum 
mechanics and the settlement of the mathematical Grundlagenstreit 
through Gödel’s Entscheidungstheorem, matter and mathematics 
really do seem to converge. But according to Bergson’s prognosis, 
even though the latest matter models come very close to being 
completely mathematized, they will never completely coincide, 
not because of faulty science or mathematics but rather because 
matter is also subjected to becoming and life. Life and matter are 
inverse and continuous movements that interrupt (or discretize) 
each other.
65In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse 
movement, and each of these two movements is simple, 
the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, 
and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting 
out in it living beings all along its track. (249)
Together but in opposite directions, life and matter are part of the 
same real process, while both human cognition and science can 
only account for the result of their interaction, namely the cut- out 
forms of living beings. Bergson’s image of an “undivided flux of 
matter” follows the energetic model of late nineteenth- century 
thermodynamics and its second law, stating that matter, if left 
alone, has a tendency toward equal distribution. While matter is 
subject to the time arrow of entropy, living beings seem to be able 
to hold off this process of thermodynamic equal distribution (or 
death) during their lifespan. An organism is able, for as long as it 
stays alive, to withstand the second law of thermodynamics and 
decrease the amount of entropy by interacting with its environ-
ment. Bergson understands this counterforce to entropy as a vital 
force [élan vital] (268). Quantum physicist Erwin Schrödinger states 
the problem in a very similar manner in his book What Is Life?, 
which resulted from a series of public lectures in 1943. Schrödinger 
explores, like Bergson, the threshold between physics and biology, 
but instead of using Bergson’s vitalist term élan vital, Schrödinger 
invents the concept of “negative entropy”:
Every process, event, happening— call it what you will; in 
a word, everything that is going on in Nature means an 
increase of the entropy of the part of the world where it is 
going on. Thus a living organism continually increases its 
entropy— or, as you may say, produces positive entropy— 
and thus tends to approach the dangerous state of maxi-
mum entropy, which is death. It can only keep aloof from 
it, i.e. alive, by continually drawing from its environment 
negative entropy— which is something very positive as we 
shall immediately see. What an organism feeds upon is 
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sential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds 
in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help produc-
ing while alive. (Schrödinger 1992, 71)
Living matter is able to keep entropy, aka death, at bay by absorbing 
negative entropy from its environment. Schrödinger did not receive 
much praise from the scientific community for his neologism, appar-
ently translating the order of the living organism into the order of 
computable matter did not help. In a rhetorical move, Schrödinger 
both introduces and abandons the concept in What Is Life, and 
introduces instead— for the first time in the history of science— the 
concept of a genetic code. The rhetoric of What Is Life? and the emer-
gence of the concept of a genetic code are remarkable, because 
unlike negative entropy, it has made an almost unprecedented 
career as a scientific concept within the life sciences over the course 
of the twentieth and twenty- first centuries. Revisiting Schrödinger’s 
disputed and now outdated concept of negative entropy is never-
theless insightful, because it differentiates between the computabili-
ty of matter and the organization of life, a distinction that the notion 
of the genetic code effaces (Weigel 2006). Schrödinger and Bergson 
were convinced that the two orders of life and matter cannot be 
converted into one, because they are complementary to each other. 
If they ever converge, it would mean the end of time and life. Their 
insight, that life and matter, living matter, is not just governed by a 
single movement but by two (because their movements are essen-
tially inverse or negative toward each other, a form of difference or 
interruption) effectively gets lost in the models of cybernetics and 
information theory that succeeded them. But the practical obstacles 
in building computer models of living matter again brings the two- 
fold aspect of living matter to the fore: When modeling dynamic or 
living processes, organized and coded processes, both movements 
have to be taken into account: the tendency of matter toward 
geometry and its interference with immanent becoming. And the 
problems of imaging and data analysis do not stop once and for all, 
indeed they carry on into the actual building of the model itself.
67Simulating	Banksia
Our second experimental system of biomaterial investigates the 
opening mechanism of follicles of Banksia attenuate. Banksia plants 
come in diverse sizes and shapes of trees and bushes, and among 
botanists they are famous for their seed pods. These cones are 
technically “dead” or “inanimate” because they no longer partici-
pate in the active metabolism of the plant, but they nevertheless 
are able to open after being exposed to the extreme environmental 
conditions of a wildfire.
Its opening mechanism enables this species, endemic to Australia, 
to compete with other trees. The research group of Michaela Eder 
at the Max Planck Institute of Colloids and Interfaces in Potsdam 
is building a computer model that allows them to run computer 
simulations of this opening mechanism. The model is an example 
of the standard computer simulation for structural analysis of 
solid matter and for the design of such, e.g. for airplane and 
automobile designs, the so- called Finite Element Method (FEM) (see 
Clough 2004). FEM is one of the most common types of computer 
simulations in and outside science today. It has a vast distribution 
among industrial engineering fields as well as in material science. 
Many disciplines use it to simulate the behavior of solid- state 
bodies under fluctuating environmental conditions such as physical 
impact, air temperature, and so on.
[Figure 3.5]. Banksia pods. After a wildfire, the pods suddenly open their lips and 
release the seeds. Image by the author.
68 Every FEM starts with defining the investigated object (and its 
model) in terms of computer mathematics and the governing 
physical and chemical laws— including Newtonian laws of motion, 
the fundamental equilibrium equations of solid mechanics, and the 
thermodynamic laws for the conversation of energy and increasing 
entropy— that mark the boundary conditions for every possible 
motion: its space of possibility. The virtual model has to comply 
with the same natural laws that govern the properties of the actual 
body, but, unlike the real banksia pod, the numeric model can only 
deal with discrete states and a finite set of elements. Therefore, 
the material continuum of the solid object has to be transformed 
into groups of finite numbers of discrete elements. One of the first 
decisions the modeler has to make, then, is what kind of mesh 
should be applied to describe the body as a network of joint points: 
If the mesh is too wide, the virtual system will be unstable, and, if 
it is too fine, the computer will take forever to run the simulations. 
After defining all mechanical- mathematical conditions and laws 
[Figure 3.6]. An important step in building the model is the segmentation of the conti-
nuous object into discrete elements. Image courtesy of Huynh Nguyen.
69of the model, one needs experimental data from the object under 
investigation.
Every computer model in biomaterials starts with imaging, and 
in this case the raw data do not stem from microscopy but from 
computer tomography scans of the pod in different stages of the 
opening process. This experimental system has the huge advan-
tage over the tunicate experiment in that the opening process can 
easily be captured by the imaging technology, e.g. by exposing the 
pod to wildfire temperatures inside a CT scanner until it opens 
its lips.
It is also quite convenient that CT and MRI already produce 3D 
images, therefore they do not have to be aligned like laser sheet 
microscopies. But they do come in a continuous, analog data form, 
therefore they have to be segmented before they can be fed into 
the computer model in the form of discrete mathematics. There 
would be no computer models in biomaterial research without the 
countless media technologies of data analysis: from simple mi-
croscopic films and photograms to x- rays, CTs, and MRIs, electron 
microscopies, cryo- electron microscopies, and so forth.
Once a viable computer model has been built, the scientists run 
simulations on different environmental parameters. The model 
is constantly revised in the process of simulation and further 
experimentation on the mechanical and biochemical qualities and 
properties of the pods. Through this interplay or loop between 
simulation runs and real- world data analysis, the behavior of the 
biomaterial and its mathematical model do indeed converge.
In comparison, the two experimental systems point out the 
difficulties in building a viable computer model of living matter. We 
also see that the FEM method much better serves to simulate the 
structural motion of inanimate matter. The obstacles for analyzing 
the unfolding of the tunicate already start with imaging— it is 
quite difficult to gather experimental data when it is impossible to 
perform electron- microscopy on the material. The movements that 
would describe the unfolding of the tunicate’s house seem  
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[Figure 3.7]. Meshing of the smooth surface. Image courtesy of Huynh Nguyen.
[Figure 3.8]. A first FEM model of the pod. Image courtesy of Huynh Nguyen.
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to be much more complex than those of the banksia pods. The 
unfolding of the tunicate house transgresses the borders between 
one, two, and three dimensions, and the unfolding motion of the 
fragile cellulose houses probably would have been better described 
in terms of fluid dynamics, since this takes place in water. By 
running simulations of the banksia opening mechanism, the model 
has falsified earlier assumptions about the material structures 
of the follicles. Searching for experimental evidence, a new set of 
spectroscopies and 3D images was produced, and eventually the 
opening mechanism was described in a satisfying way (Huss et al. 
2017). These research projects count as basic research [Grundla-
genforschung], and accordingly the models do not have any design 
applications. It is obvious, however, that the temperature- sensitive 
mechanism built or coded into the structure of the Banksia pods 
[Figure 3.9]. Validating the experimental data, the model converges with the experi-
mentally minded data. The term “convergence” refers to the state when the model can 
finally be used to analyze the actual movement of the cone and predict its behavior 
according to changing environmental factors like temperature, humidity, etc. Image 
courtesy of Huynh Nguyen.
72 could enable further research on how plants deal with wildfires 
and could very well lead to new bio- inspired designs in industry 
and architecture.
Computer simulations are able to deal with materials by focusing 
on patterns and structures instead of substances and qualities— 
they are entirely ignorant of whether or not they model the behav-
ior of tunicates, banksia, or auto bodies. Their ability to abstract 
from the immediate impressions of sensual data and their focus on 
the mathematized functions and possible behaviors of a biomate-
rial is what makes them so valuable at the interface of science and 
industry. Their degree of abstraction— their distance— from any 
concrete body or organism enables them to determine the space  
of possibility, even for the most extreme or even impossible  
environmental conditions. The model deals with the immanent 
process of becoming in negative terms by excluding and falsifying 
everything that the material could not become or do. Unlike  
cinematic simulations, computer models do indeed converge  
matter and mathematics. Because they are based on thorough 
discretization and mathematization, however, they can only be  
applied after a satisfying amount of data has been collected 
through classic experimentation. It is therefore misleading to  
speak of computer simulation as dematerialization— they just 
operate from a distance, in absence of the object, like concepts  
and numbers.
Computer	Simulations	between	 
Physics	and	Aesthetics
Since the discretization of the object can only take place in its 
absence, action at a distance is a cornerstone in biomaterial 
science— not despite but because it also depends heavily on the 
data gathered through close- up measuring and imaging technol-
ogies such as photography, spectroscopy, and 3D imaging. Both 
imaging and modeling are inevitable for the simulation of bioma-
terials, because they intermediate between measurements of the 
73actual material and the virtual design of the computer model that 
generates second- order data— data gathered through simulations 
(Pias 2011). Like cinematography, today’s simulation techniques 
discretize continuous movements and then add artificial motion, 
but the resulting images and films are data visualizations. Instead 
of representing past or actual motion, they produce negative maps 
that chart impossible motions. Like concepts, their most important 
accomplishment lies in their ability to exclude possibilities: The 
mapping of possibilities is production of negation (see Blumenberg 
and Haverkamp 2010, 75– 76). Simulation allows for the recognition 
of something that cannot be perceived, measured, or experienced 
in any other way. It enables one to discern gaps within the per-
ceived, the measured, the experienced.
Simulations belong to a history of algorithmic images, which are 
generated in a symbolic space (see Montaña and Vagt 2018). But 
the numerical models they are based on are also derived from ex-
perimental data and operate within theories based on natural laws. 
Therefore, computer simulations assemble two movements in 
different directions: one that follows the spatial, geometrical, and 
immanent order of the model and another of impossible states 
that are interrupting or rather restricting each other, generated 
by the runs of the simulation. In this sense, computer simulations 
do indeed take both spatial and temporal motions into account, 
something that Bergson, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
reserved for intellectual beings.
This bridging of life and matter in computer simulations relies 
equally on physics and aesthetics, the only two inner- worldly 
processes that can be called “real,” according to Max Bense. While 
physics follows the second law of thermodynamics, according to 
which the time arrow of increasing entropy describes the world 
in the direction of disorder or the probability of maximum equal 
distribution, aesthetics can be comprehended as the inverse 
movement, segregating instead of blending (Bense 1960, 20). In 
Bergson’s philosophy of the living, this results in two opposed 
academic cultures of science and philosophy. In Bense’s computer- 
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the place that for Bergson still belonged to vital concepts such as 
élan vital or statistic concepts such as Schrödinger’s negative en-
tropy. Both physics and aesthetics have ceased to simply describe 
the world as given— instead they try to figure out how to change 
it. Neither imitates nature any longer, rather both create their own 
objects. The computer with its regime of information and orga-
nization does not dissolve the boundaries between physics and 
aesthetics, or science and art. What it does is relate them closer 
to each other than they had been for a long time. Since computer 
simulations do not yield to any defined reality but operate within 
terms of possibilities and probabilities, attempting to create viable 
scenarios rather than ontological certainties, and abstaining from 
determining the actual outcome of single events, they are not mere 
tools or instruments of science. They are aesthetic instruments that 
change the perception of reality.
The idea that the texture of reality itself is subject to historic trans-
formations is not new to the humanities, but it seems to be largely 
absent in scientific discussions. When Blumenberg distinguishes 
between different types of reality over the course of European 
history, he points out that, unlike the incontrovertible and instanta-
neous reality mediated and guaranteed by Christian theology and 
ontology in medieval and early modern times, modern realities are 
neither guaranteed nor instantaneous. Instead, they come with “a 
sort of ‘epic’ structure, relating to the totality of a world that can 
never be completed or grasped in its entirety— a world that can 
be only partially experienced and so can never exclude different 
contexts of experience which in themselves constitute different 
worlds” (Blumenberg 1979, 33). Realities do not refer to one nature 
any longer but require constant actualization and realization. 
They often take the form of logical paradoxes, something modern 
physics incorporated like no other scientific discipline. Quantum 
and relativity physics have been operating with restricted realities 
for more than one hundred years and they reflect the boundaries 
of their validity through physical constants. For physics as well as 
75for aesthetics, reality is a context, a surrounding grammatical or 
mathematical structure:
Reality can no longer be considered an inherent quality of 
an object, but is the embodiment of a consistently applied 
syntax of elements. Reality presents itself now as ever 
before as a sort of text which takes on its particular form 
by obeying certain rules of internal consistency. Reality is 
for modern times a context [ . . . ]. Now, if aesthetic ob-
jects can have such a thing as a specific reality, they, too, 
are not only bound by the criterion of context as proof 
of their reality but are also constrained, as regards their 
scope and the wealth of elements they incorporate, to 
compete with the context of Nature, i.e., to become sec-
ondary worlds: they no longer extract, by imitation, reali-
ties from the one reality, but imitate the fact of being real. 
(Blumenberg 1979, 42)
Secondary worlds, worlds that imitate the fact of being real, are 
simulated worlds. When media theory speaks of computer simula-
tions as artificial nature or world- making technology, it has to take 
the interdependence between science and aesthetics into account. 
It must do so because not only is there an aesthetic context to 
scientific objects, but science also frames aesthetic objects. What 
might perhaps be difficult to understand about this relation is the 
fact that it disables arguments in terms of causality and instanta-
neity, because the time arrows of aesthetics and physics do not run 
in the same direction. Furthermore, the efficacy of their interaction, 
the interdependent calibration, can only be understood through 
distance. The virtual model has to be reconfigured in accordance 
with real- world data and curves that describe the actual behavior 
of the material under certain stress conditions, such as pressure, 
temperature, and humidity. Since the computer model is able to 
converge the actual and the virtual, as well as matter and mathe-
matics, it can reach a degree of reality that allows experiments to 
be conducted within this model. Once a model converges— when 
it reaches an adequate degree of reality, so to speak— it serves as 
76 second world or second nature in which mathematical experimen-
tation beyond the limits of actual matter can be conducted. It will 
never produce certainty; instead it creates new spaces of possi-
bility, be it for the design of new materials according to user and 
environmental concerns or policy making in regard to phenomena 
beyond perception, such as climate change. It is not a medium of 
certainty but of investigation and speculation.
Notes
The idea for this project emerged from interdisciplinary research on self- 
moving materials at the Cluster of Excellence “Image Knowledge Gestaltung,” 
a joint venture of Humboldt University Berlin and the Max Planck Institute for 
Colloids and Interfaces in Potsdam. This article would not have been possible 
without the work and help of Susanne Jany, Khashayar Rhazgandi, Nhu Huynh 
Nguyen, Michaela Eder, John Dunlop, and Thomas Stach. In addition, I would 
like to thank Matthias Koch, who introduced me to Blumenberg’s concept “actio 
per distans,” and to Jacob Watson for editing this article.
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